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Continuous-variable quantum authentication of physical unclonable keys

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ABSTRACT

We propose a scheme for authentication of physical keys that are materialized by optical multiple-scattering media. The authentication relies on the optical response of the key when probed by randomly selected coherent states of light, and the use of standard wavefront-shaping techniques that direct the scattered photons coherently to a specific target mode at the output. The quadratures of the electromagnetic field of the scattered light at the target mode are analysed using a homodyne detection scheme, and the acceptance or rejection of the key is decided upon the outcomes of the measurements. The proposed scheme can be implemented with current technology and offers collision resistance and robustness against key cloning.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Monte Carlo simulation of the protocol with M = 103 sessions.Each red bar gives the probability for a false key to result in an estimate pin that lies in an interval [p, p + dp). We also show the theoretically expected probability Pin, given by Eq. (14), together with the estimate for the true key for the given M. The vertical dashed lines define Pin ± ε. The probabilities have been obtained by simulating the verification of 500 randomly chosen false keys, as well as the verification of the true key (for which the phase mask of the SLM is optimized). Note that the histogram for the false keys is peaked at a distance which is about an order of magnitude away from Pin, whereas the estimate for the true key satisfies /pin − Pin/ < ε. Parameters:  modes, uniform illumination of SLM, τ = 0.8, η = 0.55, δ = 2σ, dp = 0.01, ε = 0.05, l/L = 0.2, μP = 2500, N = 11.
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f5: Monte Carlo simulation of the protocol with M = 103 sessions.Each red bar gives the probability for a false key to result in an estimate pin that lies in an interval [p, p + dp). We also show the theoretically expected probability Pin, given by Eq. (14), together with the estimate for the true key for the given M. The vertical dashed lines define Pin ± ε. The probabilities have been obtained by simulating the verification of 500 randomly chosen false keys, as well as the verification of the true key (for which the phase mask of the SLM is optimized). Note that the histogram for the false keys is peaked at a distance which is about an order of magnitude away from Pin, whereas the estimate for the true key satisfies /pin − Pin/ < ε. Parameters: modes, uniform illumination of SLM, τ = 0.8, η = 0.55, δ = 2σ, dp = 0.01, ε = 0.05, l/L = 0.2, μP = 2500, N = 11.

Mentions: To confirm the above observations, we have performed simulations of the EAP for various combinations of parameters. More details about our simulations can be found in the Methods section, and in Fig. 5 we present an example of our results. Clearly, with high probability the false key results in an estimate pin, which is about an order of magnitude smaller than the expected probability Pin, and thus it will be detected by a verification test with any error ε < 1. At the same time the true key results in an estimate that satisfies , and thus it will pass the verification test. Condition (17) is readily satisfied for the parameters used in Fig. 5 (we have and ), leading to the depicted difference between Pin and pin in the case of a false key.


Continuous-variable quantum authentication of physical unclonable keys
Monte Carlo simulation of the protocol with M = 103 sessions.Each red bar gives the probability for a false key to result in an estimate pin that lies in an interval [p, p + dp). We also show the theoretically expected probability Pin, given by Eq. (14), together with the estimate for the true key for the given M. The vertical dashed lines define Pin ± ε. The probabilities have been obtained by simulating the verification of 500 randomly chosen false keys, as well as the verification of the true key (for which the phase mask of the SLM is optimized). Note that the histogram for the false keys is peaked at a distance which is about an order of magnitude away from Pin, whereas the estimate for the true key satisfies /pin − Pin/ < ε. Parameters:  modes, uniform illumination of SLM, τ = 0.8, η = 0.55, δ = 2σ, dp = 0.01, ε = 0.05, l/L = 0.2, μP = 2500, N = 11.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

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Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC5385567&req=5

f5: Monte Carlo simulation of the protocol with M = 103 sessions.Each red bar gives the probability for a false key to result in an estimate pin that lies in an interval [p, p + dp). We also show the theoretically expected probability Pin, given by Eq. (14), together with the estimate for the true key for the given M. The vertical dashed lines define Pin ± ε. The probabilities have been obtained by simulating the verification of 500 randomly chosen false keys, as well as the verification of the true key (for which the phase mask of the SLM is optimized). Note that the histogram for the false keys is peaked at a distance which is about an order of magnitude away from Pin, whereas the estimate for the true key satisfies /pin − Pin/ < ε. Parameters: modes, uniform illumination of SLM, τ = 0.8, η = 0.55, δ = 2σ, dp = 0.01, ε = 0.05, l/L = 0.2, μP = 2500, N = 11.
Mentions: To confirm the above observations, we have performed simulations of the EAP for various combinations of parameters. More details about our simulations can be found in the Methods section, and in Fig. 5 we present an example of our results. Clearly, with high probability the false key results in an estimate pin, which is about an order of magnitude smaller than the expected probability Pin, and thus it will be detected by a verification test with any error ε < 1. At the same time the true key results in an estimate that satisfies , and thus it will pass the verification test. Condition (17) is readily satisfied for the parameters used in Fig. 5 (we have and ), leading to the depicted difference between Pin and pin in the case of a false key.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

ABSTRACT

We propose a scheme for authentication of physical keys that are materialized by optical multiple-scattering media. The authentication relies on the optical response of the key when probed by randomly selected coherent states of light, and the use of standard wavefront-shaping techniques that direct the scattered photons coherently to a specific target mode at the output. The quadratures of the electromagnetic field of the scattered light at the target mode are analysed using a homodyne detection scheme, and the acceptance or rejection of the key is decided upon the outcomes of the measurements. The proposed scheme can be implemented with current technology and offers collision resistance and robustness against key cloning.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus