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The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.

Xu B, Wang J - Sci Rep (2015)

Bottom Line: We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones.Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios.The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, 110000.

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation by coupling two simple mechanisms into the model: tie strength based investment preference and homophily assumption. We construct the model by categorizing game participants into four types: prosocialists (players who prefers to invest in their intimate friends), antisocialists (players who prefer to invest in strangers), egoists (players who never cooperate) and altruists (players who cooperate indifferently with anyone). We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones. Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios. The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures. The results show that this argument is robust against the variations of initial conditions and therefore can be considered as a fundamental theoretical framework to study relationship-based cooperation in reality.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

The fraction of different types of players as a function of investment preference α under DB updating rules.Strong α promotes prosocialists in our model.
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f4: The fraction of different types of players as a function of investment preference α under DB updating rules.Strong α promotes prosocialists in our model.

Mentions: We further explore the robustness of this conclusion by first adopting a death-birth (DB) updating mechanism. We use tag-based cooperation framework here293031 to perform the simulation on a 100 × 100 empty lattice with periodic conditions, where the evolutionary process is defined as the following four stages: immigration, interaction, reproduction, and death. First, an immigrant with a random behavioral pattern enters the network and locates on a random empty site. Second, each immigrant in the lattice has its potential to reproduce (PTR) rate set to 0.12 initially, and agents plays with all its neighbors under our proposed interaction framework (see Table 2) to accumulate its PTR. E.g. a prosocialist I provides of its PTR to j and the recipient j increases its PTR by (we set c = 0.01, b = 0.03 in the simulation). Third, each agent has a chance to reproduce on a randomly chosen empty neighbor, and this probability is equal to its PTR. The offspring inherits the behavioral pattern of its parent with a mutation rate of 0.005, and a strong tie strength value will be assigned to the tie between the parent and the offspring. Finally, each player has a 0.1 probability to die (Fig. 4)


The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.

Xu B, Wang J - Sci Rep (2015)

The fraction of different types of players as a function of investment preference α under DB updating rules.Strong α promotes prosocialists in our model.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4644968&req=5

f4: The fraction of different types of players as a function of investment preference α under DB updating rules.Strong α promotes prosocialists in our model.
Mentions: We further explore the robustness of this conclusion by first adopting a death-birth (DB) updating mechanism. We use tag-based cooperation framework here293031 to perform the simulation on a 100 × 100 empty lattice with periodic conditions, where the evolutionary process is defined as the following four stages: immigration, interaction, reproduction, and death. First, an immigrant with a random behavioral pattern enters the network and locates on a random empty site. Second, each immigrant in the lattice has its potential to reproduce (PTR) rate set to 0.12 initially, and agents plays with all its neighbors under our proposed interaction framework (see Table 2) to accumulate its PTR. E.g. a prosocialist I provides of its PTR to j and the recipient j increases its PTR by (we set c = 0.01, b = 0.03 in the simulation). Third, each agent has a chance to reproduce on a randomly chosen empty neighbor, and this probability is equal to its PTR. The offspring inherits the behavioral pattern of its parent with a mutation rate of 0.005, and a strong tie strength value will be assigned to the tie between the parent and the offspring. Finally, each player has a 0.1 probability to die (Fig. 4)

Bottom Line: We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones.Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios.The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, 110000.

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation by coupling two simple mechanisms into the model: tie strength based investment preference and homophily assumption. We construct the model by categorizing game participants into four types: prosocialists (players who prefers to invest in their intimate friends), antisocialists (players who prefer to invest in strangers), egoists (players who never cooperate) and altruists (players who cooperate indifferently with anyone). We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones. Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios. The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures. The results show that this argument is robust against the variations of initial conditions and therefore can be considered as a fundamental theoretical framework to study relationship-based cooperation in reality.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus