Limits...
The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.

Xu B, Wang J - Sci Rep (2015)

Bottom Line: We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones.Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios.The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, 110000.

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation by coupling two simple mechanisms into the model: tie strength based investment preference and homophily assumption. We construct the model by categorizing game participants into four types: prosocialists (players who prefers to invest in their intimate friends), antisocialists (players who prefer to invest in strangers), egoists (players who never cooperate) and altruists (players who cooperate indifferently with anyone). We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones. Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios. The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures. The results show that this argument is robust against the variations of initial conditions and therefore can be considered as a fundamental theoretical framework to study relationship-based cooperation in reality.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Snapshots of the evolutionary process for (a)  (b)  (c).Figure 3 Snapshots of the evolutionary processes for different α on a 100 × 100 lattice. We set b = 1.1, c = 0.1 here. White nodes represents prosocialists, red for antisocialists, blue for egoists and black for altruists. The whole process can be summarized as two stages: cluster formation and cluster competition. First, the four types of players form clusters respectively. Second, clusters of different types compete for a living. It can be clearly observed from the figure that egoists dominate the lattice network when α = 0. However, prosocialists outperforms any other types if a significant level of relationship-based investment preference is introduced.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4644968&req=5

f3: Snapshots of the evolutionary process for (a) (b) (c).Figure 3 Snapshots of the evolutionary processes for different α on a 100 × 100 lattice. We set b = 1.1, c = 0.1 here. White nodes represents prosocialists, red for antisocialists, blue for egoists and black for altruists. The whole process can be summarized as two stages: cluster formation and cluster competition. First, the four types of players form clusters respectively. Second, clusters of different types compete for a living. It can be clearly observed from the figure that egoists dominate the lattice network when α = 0. However, prosocialists outperforms any other types if a significant level of relationship-based investment preference is introduced.

Mentions: The above arguments can also be validated by the evolutionary process of different types of players under different α (see Fig. 2). When α is significant, we observe a turning point for the fraction of egoists. This pattern indicates that fact that the introduction of strong α will facilitate egoists to form clusters initially (see Fig. 3), isolated prosocialists, altruists and antisocialists are mostly likely to be converted into egoists. However, since egoist clusters produce lowest benefit while α brings additional benefits to prosocialists clusters, egoists will be gradually invaded by prosocialists. This effect leads to the final dominance of prosocialists in the evolution (see Fig. 3).


The Emergence of Relationship-based Cooperation.

Xu B, Wang J - Sci Rep (2015)

Snapshots of the evolutionary process for (a)  (b)  (c).Figure 3 Snapshots of the evolutionary processes for different α on a 100 × 100 lattice. We set b = 1.1, c = 0.1 here. White nodes represents prosocialists, red for antisocialists, blue for egoists and black for altruists. The whole process can be summarized as two stages: cluster formation and cluster competition. First, the four types of players form clusters respectively. Second, clusters of different types compete for a living. It can be clearly observed from the figure that egoists dominate the lattice network when α = 0. However, prosocialists outperforms any other types if a significant level of relationship-based investment preference is introduced.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4644968&req=5

f3: Snapshots of the evolutionary process for (a) (b) (c).Figure 3 Snapshots of the evolutionary processes for different α on a 100 × 100 lattice. We set b = 1.1, c = 0.1 here. White nodes represents prosocialists, red for antisocialists, blue for egoists and black for altruists. The whole process can be summarized as two stages: cluster formation and cluster competition. First, the four types of players form clusters respectively. Second, clusters of different types compete for a living. It can be clearly observed from the figure that egoists dominate the lattice network when α = 0. However, prosocialists outperforms any other types if a significant level of relationship-based investment preference is introduced.
Mentions: The above arguments can also be validated by the evolutionary process of different types of players under different α (see Fig. 2). When α is significant, we observe a turning point for the fraction of egoists. This pattern indicates that fact that the introduction of strong α will facilitate egoists to form clusters initially (see Fig. 3), isolated prosocialists, altruists and antisocialists are mostly likely to be converted into egoists. However, since egoist clusters produce lowest benefit while α brings additional benefits to prosocialists clusters, egoists will be gradually invaded by prosocialists. This effect leads to the final dominance of prosocialists in the evolution (see Fig. 3).

Bottom Line: We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones.Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios.The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, 110000.

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation by coupling two simple mechanisms into the model: tie strength based investment preference and homophily assumption. We construct the model by categorizing game participants into four types: prosocialists (players who prefers to invest in their intimate friends), antisocialists (players who prefer to invest in strangers), egoists (players who never cooperate) and altruists (players who cooperate indifferently with anyone). We show that the relationship-based cooperation (prosocialists) is favored throughout the evolution if we assume players of the same type have stronger ties than different ones. Moreover, we discover that strengthening the internal bonds within the strategic clusters further promotes the competitiveness of prosocialists and therefore facilitates the emergence of relationship-based cooperation in our proposed scenarios. The robustness of the model is also tested under different strategy updating rules and network structures. The results show that this argument is robust against the variations of initial conditions and therefore can be considered as a fundamental theoretical framework to study relationship-based cooperation in reality.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus