Limits...
Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.


The game with payoffs expressed in experimental tokens (conversion rate: 1 token = 0.05€).
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Figure 4: The game with payoffs expressed in experimental tokens (conversion rate: 1 token = 0.05€).

Mentions: Subjects were all Italian undergraduate students (65.9% from Economics), with 43.8% females. We employed a between-subjects design: no individual participated in more than one session. Payoffs were expressed in experimental tokens and each token was converted into 0.05€ (see Figure 4). In each session, the participants were paid a 2€ show-up fee, plus their earnings from the experiment. The average payment per participant was 8.41€ (plus the show-up fee) and the sessions averaged approximately 1 h.


Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

The game with payoffs expressed in experimental tokens (conversion rate: 1 token = 0.05€).
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4593938&req=5

Figure 4: The game with payoffs expressed in experimental tokens (conversion rate: 1 token = 0.05€).
Mentions: Subjects were all Italian undergraduate students (65.9% from Economics), with 43.8% females. We employed a between-subjects design: no individual participated in more than one session. Payoffs were expressed in experimental tokens and each token was converted into 0.05€ (see Figure 4). In each session, the participants were paid a 2€ show-up fee, plus their earnings from the experiment. The average payment per participant was 8.41€ (plus the show-up fee) and the sessions averaged approximately 1 h.

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.