Limits...
Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Trust game with exposure and a costly exit option.
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Figure 2: Trust game with exposure and a costly exit option.

Mentions: In addition to exposure, moreover, we have also added the possibility for B players to misinform their matched A about their actual choice. In particular, in our design, each B subject had the option to deceive the matched A subject. In particular, each B could decide to pay a cost for letting the matched A believe that a bad outcome was due to an unlucky dice roll and not to B's choice to keep the whole pot for himself. Since only B players were informed of this exit option, the resulting game was one of incomplete information in which the structure of the social interaction was not common knowledge (see Figure 2).


Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

Trust game with exposure and a costly exit option.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4593938&req=5

Figure 2: Trust game with exposure and a costly exit option.
Mentions: In addition to exposure, moreover, we have also added the possibility for B players to misinform their matched A about their actual choice. In particular, in our design, each B subject had the option to deceive the matched A subject. In particular, each B could decide to pay a cost for letting the matched A believe that a bad outcome was due to an unlucky dice roll and not to B's choice to keep the whole pot for himself. Since only B players were informed of this exit option, the resulting game was one of incomplete information in which the structure of the social interaction was not common knowledge (see Figure 2).

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus