Limits...
Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.


The risky Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The dashed arrow means that the trustee (B) can unilaterally send a message to the trustor (A). Payoffs are expressed in Euros.
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Figure 1: The risky Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The dashed arrow means that the trustee (B) can unilaterally send a message to the trustor (A). Payoffs are expressed in Euros.

Mentions: C&D design is a trust game with a hidden action, a risky component, and with the possibility for the trustee to send a non-binding message (see Figure 1).


Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Andrighetto G, Grieco D, Tummolini L - Front Psychol (2015)

The risky Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The dashed arrow means that the trustee (B) can unilaterally send a message to the trustor (A). Payoffs are expressed in Euros.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4593938&req=5

Figure 1: The risky Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The dashed arrow means that the trustee (B) can unilaterally send a message to the trustor (A). Payoffs are expressed in Euros.
Mentions: C&D design is a trust game with a hidden action, a risky component, and with the possibility for the trustee to send a non-binding message (see Figure 1).

Bottom Line: Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible.Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations.Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council Rome, Italy ; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute Fiesole, Italy.

ABSTRACT
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

No MeSH data available.