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Understanding Cooperative Behavior Based on the Coevolution of Game Strategy and Link Weight.

Huang K, Zheng X, Li Z, Yang Y - Sci Rep (2015)

Bottom Line: By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently.Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner's dilemma.The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.

ABSTRACT
In reality, the dependency relationship among individuals is heterogeneous and time-varying. Based on this fact, we present a new mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight when analyzing the evolution of cooperation. In detail, we model the population on a regular network, on which the relationship between players is depicted by a weighted link, and prisoner's dilemma has been applied to describe the interaction of players. Further, the impact of this mechanism on the cooperative behavior has been outlined. By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently. Compared with the traditional case, when the temptation of defection b is large, the fraction of cooperation is still able to keep in a high level. With a comprehensive examination of the distribution of stable link weight, it is evident that the coevolution mechanism would deviate the initial distribution. This mechanism induces the heterogeneity of players, which enhances the fraction of cooperation. Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner's dilemma. The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.

No MeSH data available.


Relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when δ = 0.8 and Δ varied. Here, the black curve is corresponding to the traditional case (namely Δ = 0.0), the red curve is Δ = 0.1 , the blue curve is Δ = 0.2, the pink curve is Δ = 0.4 and the green curve is Δ = 0.8. The size of the regular network is equal to 100 × 100.
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f5: Relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when δ = 0.8 and Δ varied. Here, the black curve is corresponding to the traditional case (namely Δ = 0.0), the red curve is Δ = 0.1 , the blue curve is Δ = 0.2, the pink curve is Δ = 0.4 and the green curve is Δ = 0.8. The size of the regular network is equal to 100 × 100.

Mentions: Now, let us turn our attention to the relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when the link weight is fixed in Fig. 5. In the traditional case, the fraction of cooperation ρC fast decreases with b, and will die out at around b = 1.24. However, if link weight is introduced, this case will greatly change. It is clear that even Δ = 0.1 can promote cooperation to complete dominance till sufficiently large b. With increment of Δ, this case will get further improvement. However, if Δ continues to increase, it will in turn impede the cooperation. For example, Δ = 0.8 can make cooperation go extinction again. Totally, this figure validates the observation of Fig. 1: middle link weight amplitude promotes cooperation best.


Understanding Cooperative Behavior Based on the Coevolution of Game Strategy and Link Weight.

Huang K, Zheng X, Li Z, Yang Y - Sci Rep (2015)

Relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when δ = 0.8 and Δ varied. Here, the black curve is corresponding to the traditional case (namely Δ = 0.0), the red curve is Δ = 0.1 , the blue curve is Δ = 0.2, the pink curve is Δ = 0.4 and the green curve is Δ = 0.8. The size of the regular network is equal to 100 × 100.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4593172&req=5

f5: Relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when δ = 0.8 and Δ varied. Here, the black curve is corresponding to the traditional case (namely Δ = 0.0), the red curve is Δ = 0.1 , the blue curve is Δ = 0.2, the pink curve is Δ = 0.4 and the green curve is Δ = 0.8. The size of the regular network is equal to 100 × 100.
Mentions: Now, let us turn our attention to the relationship between the fraction of cooperation ρC and temptation parameter b when the link weight is fixed in Fig. 5. In the traditional case, the fraction of cooperation ρC fast decreases with b, and will die out at around b = 1.24. However, if link weight is introduced, this case will greatly change. It is clear that even Δ = 0.1 can promote cooperation to complete dominance till sufficiently large b. With increment of Δ, this case will get further improvement. However, if Δ continues to increase, it will in turn impede the cooperation. For example, Δ = 0.8 can make cooperation go extinction again. Totally, this figure validates the observation of Fig. 1: middle link weight amplitude promotes cooperation best.

Bottom Line: By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently.Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner's dilemma.The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.

ABSTRACT
In reality, the dependency relationship among individuals is heterogeneous and time-varying. Based on this fact, we present a new mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight when analyzing the evolution of cooperation. In detail, we model the population on a regular network, on which the relationship between players is depicted by a weighted link, and prisoner's dilemma has been applied to describe the interaction of players. Further, the impact of this mechanism on the cooperative behavior has been outlined. By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently. Compared with the traditional case, when the temptation of defection b is large, the fraction of cooperation is still able to keep in a high level. With a comprehensive examination of the distribution of stable link weight, it is evident that the coevolution mechanism would deviate the initial distribution. This mechanism induces the heterogeneity of players, which enhances the fraction of cooperation. Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner's dilemma. The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.

No MeSH data available.