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Stylized Facts in Brazilian Vote Distributions.

Calvão AM, Crokidakis N, Anteneodo C - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: In its simplest setting, the model can not explain the cutoff, formed by the most voted candidates, whose success is determined mainly by their peculiar, intrinsic characteristics, such as previous publicity.However, the modeling allows to interpret the scaling of p(v), yielding a predictor of the degree of feedback in the interactions of the electorate.Knowledge of the feedback is relevant beyond the context of elections, since a similar interactivity may occur for other social contagion processes in the same population.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Physics, PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.

ABSTRACT
Elections, specially in countries such as Brazil, with an electorate of the order of 100 million people, yield large-scale data-sets embodying valuable information on the dynamics through which individuals influence each other and make choices. In this work we perform an extensive analysis of data sets available for Brazilian proportional elections of legislators and city councilors throughout the period 1970-2014, which embraces two distinct political regimes: a military regime followed by a democratic one. We perform a comparative analysis of elections for legislative positions, in different states and years, through the distribution p(v) of the number of candidates receiving v votes. We show the impact of the different political regimes on the vote distributions. Although p(v) has a common shape, with a scaling behavior, quantitative details change over time and from one electorate to another. In order to interpret the observed features, we propose a multi-species model consisting in a system of nonlinear differential equations, with values of the parameters that reflect the heterogeneity of candidates. In its simplest setting, the model can not explain the cutoff, formed by the most voted candidates, whose success is determined mainly by their peculiar, intrinsic characteristics, such as previous publicity. However, the modeling allows to interpret the scaling of p(v), yielding a predictor of the degree of feedback in the interactions of the electorate. Knowledge of the feedback is relevant beyond the context of elections, since a similar interactivity may occur for other social contagion processes in the same population.

No MeSH data available.


Electoral sizes.Quantities of valid nominal votes Nv (blue), number of candidates Nc (red) and number of parties Np (gren), for state (S) and federal (F) deputies, and capital city councilors (C) as a function of the electoral year. Data for 1994 were unavailable.
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pone.0137732.g006: Electoral sizes.Quantities of valid nominal votes Nv (blue), number of candidates Nc (red) and number of parties Np (gren), for state (S) and federal (F) deputies, and capital city councilors (C) as a function of the electoral year. Data for 1994 were unavailable.

Mentions: Concerning the military regime, if one looks at an isolated single PDF (for instance in the panels from that period in S1–S4 Figs), it is difficult to recognize the pattern with flat and power-law regions observed for recent elections. In particular, the flat region is absent. However, if we look at the full temporal sequence in each one of those figures, one can recognize a definite slope in the shadowed area that tends to a small value when going back to the past. Lower than one, almost , values of α are observed. According to the model, these small values can be associated to negative feedback (γ < 1) and/or absence of interaction of the electorate (large c), respectively. Both features are consistent with a dictatorial regime imposing severe restrictions to social interactivity, generating distrust and negative feedback. The probability for low number of votes is also due to the restrictions eliminating the amateur candidates observed in later elections. However, the errors and uncertainty are large, due to the low number of candidates in the military regime (see Fig 6). In fact, the number of candidatures and electoral choices were initially small and increased during the transition from bipartidism to pluripartidism [24]. In the measure that some of the restrictions to democracy gradually relaxed towards the end of the military regime, the increase of α is observed, as well as the appearance of the plateau.


Stylized Facts in Brazilian Vote Distributions.

Calvão AM, Crokidakis N, Anteneodo C - PLoS ONE (2015)

Electoral sizes.Quantities of valid nominal votes Nv (blue), number of candidates Nc (red) and number of parties Np (gren), for state (S) and federal (F) deputies, and capital city councilors (C) as a function of the electoral year. Data for 1994 were unavailable.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4587976&req=5

pone.0137732.g006: Electoral sizes.Quantities of valid nominal votes Nv (blue), number of candidates Nc (red) and number of parties Np (gren), for state (S) and federal (F) deputies, and capital city councilors (C) as a function of the electoral year. Data for 1994 were unavailable.
Mentions: Concerning the military regime, if one looks at an isolated single PDF (for instance in the panels from that period in S1–S4 Figs), it is difficult to recognize the pattern with flat and power-law regions observed for recent elections. In particular, the flat region is absent. However, if we look at the full temporal sequence in each one of those figures, one can recognize a definite slope in the shadowed area that tends to a small value when going back to the past. Lower than one, almost , values of α are observed. According to the model, these small values can be associated to negative feedback (γ < 1) and/or absence of interaction of the electorate (large c), respectively. Both features are consistent with a dictatorial regime imposing severe restrictions to social interactivity, generating distrust and negative feedback. The probability for low number of votes is also due to the restrictions eliminating the amateur candidates observed in later elections. However, the errors and uncertainty are large, due to the low number of candidates in the military regime (see Fig 6). In fact, the number of candidatures and electoral choices were initially small and increased during the transition from bipartidism to pluripartidism [24]. In the measure that some of the restrictions to democracy gradually relaxed towards the end of the military regime, the increase of α is observed, as well as the appearance of the plateau.

Bottom Line: In its simplest setting, the model can not explain the cutoff, formed by the most voted candidates, whose success is determined mainly by their peculiar, intrinsic characteristics, such as previous publicity.However, the modeling allows to interpret the scaling of p(v), yielding a predictor of the degree of feedback in the interactions of the electorate.Knowledge of the feedback is relevant beyond the context of elections, since a similar interactivity may occur for other social contagion processes in the same population.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Physics, PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.

ABSTRACT
Elections, specially in countries such as Brazil, with an electorate of the order of 100 million people, yield large-scale data-sets embodying valuable information on the dynamics through which individuals influence each other and make choices. In this work we perform an extensive analysis of data sets available for Brazilian proportional elections of legislators and city councilors throughout the period 1970-2014, which embraces two distinct political regimes: a military regime followed by a democratic one. We perform a comparative analysis of elections for legislative positions, in different states and years, through the distribution p(v) of the number of candidates receiving v votes. We show the impact of the different political regimes on the vote distributions. Although p(v) has a common shape, with a scaling behavior, quantitative details change over time and from one electorate to another. In order to interpret the observed features, we propose a multi-species model consisting in a system of nonlinear differential equations, with values of the parameters that reflect the heterogeneity of candidates. In its simplest setting, the model can not explain the cutoff, formed by the most voted candidates, whose success is determined mainly by their peculiar, intrinsic characteristics, such as previous publicity. However, the modeling allows to interpret the scaling of p(v), yielding a predictor of the degree of feedback in the interactions of the electorate. Knowledge of the feedback is relevant beyond the context of elections, since a similar interactivity may occur for other social contagion processes in the same population.

No MeSH data available.