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The impact of threat of shock on the framing effect and temporal discounting: executive functions unperturbed by acute stress?

Robinson OJ, Bond RL, Roiser JP - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear.Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress.We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London UK.

ABSTRACT
Anxiety and stress-related disorders constitute a large global health burden, but are still poorly understood. Prior work has demonstrated clear impacts of stress upon basic cognitive function: biasing attention toward unexpected and potentially threatening information and instantiating a negative affective bias. However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear. In this study, we examined the impact of a translational within-subjects stress induction (threat of unpredictable shock) on two well-established executive decision-making biases: the framing effect (N = 83), and temporal discounting (N = 36). In both studies, we demonstrate (a) clear subjective effects of stress, and (b) clear executive decision-making biases but (c) no impact of stress on these decision-making biases. Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress. We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts. As such, although stress can induce a transient affective biases and altered mood, these need not result in poor financial decision-making.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Stress has (A) no behavioral effect on temporal discounting, but does (B) induce relative decision-speeding under threat in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
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Figure 3: Stress has (A) no behavioral effect on temporal discounting, but does (B) induce relative decision-speeding under threat in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.

Mentions: Temporal discounting was demonstrated by a significant main effect of delay on indifference points [F(2,70) = 79, p < 0.001, = 0.7]. This varied depending upon whether subjects were asked about wins or losses [time × valence interaction: F(2,70) = 8, p = 0.001, = 0.2] but did not differ across the different values [time × value interaction: F(4,140) = 1.3, p = 0.26, = 0.04]. Critically, this also did not differ under stress [time × stress interaction: F(2,70) = 0.24, p = 0.79, = 0.007, Figure 3A; main effect of stress: F(1,35) = 0.8, p = 0.37, = 0.02; time × valence × stress: F(2,70) = 0.16, p = 0.86, = 0.004; time × valence × value × stress: F(4,140) = 0.73, p = 0.58, = 0.02]. Bayes factor analysis revealed a winning indifference point model comprising a time by valence interaction (logBF10 = 294) that was decisively (>150 times) better than model additionally including a stress by time interaction (logBF10 = 264), a stress by valence by time model (logBF10 = 271) or a time alone model (logBF10 = 271).


The impact of threat of shock on the framing effect and temporal discounting: executive functions unperturbed by acute stress?

Robinson OJ, Bond RL, Roiser JP - Front Psychol (2015)

Stress has (A) no behavioral effect on temporal discounting, but does (B) induce relative decision-speeding under threat in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4562307&req=5

Figure 3: Stress has (A) no behavioral effect on temporal discounting, but does (B) induce relative decision-speeding under threat in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
Mentions: Temporal discounting was demonstrated by a significant main effect of delay on indifference points [F(2,70) = 79, p < 0.001, = 0.7]. This varied depending upon whether subjects were asked about wins or losses [time × valence interaction: F(2,70) = 8, p = 0.001, = 0.2] but did not differ across the different values [time × value interaction: F(4,140) = 1.3, p = 0.26, = 0.04]. Critically, this also did not differ under stress [time × stress interaction: F(2,70) = 0.24, p = 0.79, = 0.007, Figure 3A; main effect of stress: F(1,35) = 0.8, p = 0.37, = 0.02; time × valence × stress: F(2,70) = 0.16, p = 0.86, = 0.004; time × valence × value × stress: F(4,140) = 0.73, p = 0.58, = 0.02]. Bayes factor analysis revealed a winning indifference point model comprising a time by valence interaction (logBF10 = 294) that was decisively (>150 times) better than model additionally including a stress by time interaction (logBF10 = 264), a stress by valence by time model (logBF10 = 271) or a time alone model (logBF10 = 271).

Bottom Line: However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear.Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress.We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London UK.

ABSTRACT
Anxiety and stress-related disorders constitute a large global health burden, but are still poorly understood. Prior work has demonstrated clear impacts of stress upon basic cognitive function: biasing attention toward unexpected and potentially threatening information and instantiating a negative affective bias. However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear. In this study, we examined the impact of a translational within-subjects stress induction (threat of unpredictable shock) on two well-established executive decision-making biases: the framing effect (N = 83), and temporal discounting (N = 36). In both studies, we demonstrate (a) clear subjective effects of stress, and (b) clear executive decision-making biases but (c) no impact of stress on these decision-making biases. Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress. We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts. As such, although stress can induce a transient affective biases and altered mood, these need not result in poor financial decision-making.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus