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The impact of threat of shock on the framing effect and temporal discounting: executive functions unperturbed by acute stress?

Robinson OJ, Bond RL, Roiser JP - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear.Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress.We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London UK.

ABSTRACT
Anxiety and stress-related disorders constitute a large global health burden, but are still poorly understood. Prior work has demonstrated clear impacts of stress upon basic cognitive function: biasing attention toward unexpected and potentially threatening information and instantiating a negative affective bias. However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear. In this study, we examined the impact of a translational within-subjects stress induction (threat of unpredictable shock) on two well-established executive decision-making biases: the framing effect (N = 83), and temporal discounting (N = 36). In both studies, we demonstrate (a) clear subjective effects of stress, and (b) clear executive decision-making biases but (c) no impact of stress on these decision-making biases. Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress. We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts. As such, although stress can induce a transient affective biases and altered mood, these need not result in poor financial decision-making.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

(A) The framing effect did not differ between stress conditions in terms of the proportion of gambles accepted, but (B) stress did speed up responses (in seconds) in the gains domain. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
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Figure 2: (A) The framing effect did not differ between stress conditions in terms of the proportion of gambles accepted, but (B) stress did speed up responses (in seconds) in the gains domain. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.

Mentions: A significant framing effect was demonstrated. Specifically, participants gambled more in the losses frame (probability of gambling = 0.54 ± 0.2) than in the gains frame [probability of gambling = 0.37 ± 0.2; main effect of frame: F(1,82) = 83, p < 0.001, = 0.5]. However, this did not interact with threat of shock [stress × frame interaction: F(1,82) = 0.13, p = 0.72, = 0.002; Figure 2A] and there was no main effect of stress [F(1,82) = 3.7, p = 0.06, = 0.043]. Bayes factor analysis revealed the winning model to be one including only a main effect of frame (logBF10 = 46), which was substantially (7.6 times) better than a model additionally including the stress × frame interaction (logBF10 = 44).


The impact of threat of shock on the framing effect and temporal discounting: executive functions unperturbed by acute stress?

Robinson OJ, Bond RL, Roiser JP - Front Psychol (2015)

(A) The framing effect did not differ between stress conditions in terms of the proportion of gambles accepted, but (B) stress did speed up responses (in seconds) in the gains domain. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4562307&req=5

Figure 2: (A) The framing effect did not differ between stress conditions in terms of the proportion of gambles accepted, but (B) stress did speed up responses (in seconds) in the gains domain. Error bars indicate SEM; *p < 0.01.
Mentions: A significant framing effect was demonstrated. Specifically, participants gambled more in the losses frame (probability of gambling = 0.54 ± 0.2) than in the gains frame [probability of gambling = 0.37 ± 0.2; main effect of frame: F(1,82) = 83, p < 0.001, = 0.5]. However, this did not interact with threat of shock [stress × frame interaction: F(1,82) = 0.13, p = 0.72, = 0.002; Figure 2A] and there was no main effect of stress [F(1,82) = 3.7, p = 0.06, = 0.043]. Bayes factor analysis revealed the winning model to be one including only a main effect of frame (logBF10 = 46), which was substantially (7.6 times) better than a model additionally including the stress × frame interaction (logBF10 = 44).

Bottom Line: However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear.Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress.We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London UK.

ABSTRACT
Anxiety and stress-related disorders constitute a large global health burden, but are still poorly understood. Prior work has demonstrated clear impacts of stress upon basic cognitive function: biasing attention toward unexpected and potentially threatening information and instantiating a negative affective bias. However, the impact that these changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear. In this study, we examined the impact of a translational within-subjects stress induction (threat of unpredictable shock) on two well-established executive decision-making biases: the framing effect (N = 83), and temporal discounting (N = 36). In both studies, we demonstrate (a) clear subjective effects of stress, and (b) clear executive decision-making biases but (c) no impact of stress on these decision-making biases. Indeed, Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models that did not include stress. We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c), some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts. As such, although stress can induce a transient affective biases and altered mood, these need not result in poor financial decision-making.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus