Limits...
Self-concept in fairness and rule establishment during a competitive game: a computational approach.

Lee SH, Kim SP, Cho YS - Front Psychol (2015)

Bottom Line: When the models were fitted to a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with "switching" and "mutual avoidance" patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game.In contrast, the difference of parameters between the players in the "unfair" and "mutual rush" patterns did not become stable.The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, Korea University Seoul, South Korea.

ABSTRACT
People consider fairness as well as their own interest when making decisions in economic games. The present study proposes a model that encompasses the self-concept determined by one's own kindness as a factor of fairness. To observe behavioral patterns that reflect self-concept and fairness, a chicken game experiment was conducted. Behavioral data demonstrates four distinct patterns; "switching," "mutual rush," "mutual avoidance," and "unfair" patterns. Model estimation of chicken game data shows that a model with self-concept predicts those behaviors better than previous models of fairness, suggesting that self-concept indeed affects human behavior in competitive economic games. Moreover, a non-stationary parameter analysis revealed the process of reaching consensus between the players in a game. When the models were fitted to a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with "switching" and "mutual avoidance" patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game. In contrast, the difference of parameters between the players in the "unfair" and "mutual rush" patterns did not become stable. The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.

No MeSH data available.


Differences of the parameters between two players in the self-concept model as a function of time progress. The dashed line represents the additive inverse of the log likelihood value (-logL), which is proportional to the BIC score (see Equation 12).
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4561810&req=5

Figure 6: Differences of the parameters between two players in the self-concept model as a function of time progress. The dashed line represents the additive inverse of the log likelihood value (-logL), which is proportional to the BIC score (see Equation 12).

Mentions: For Cox et al.'s model and the self-concept model, which appeared to explain the behavior patterns better than the baseline, the non-stationary parameter analysis was conducted. Among the 81 sets of 20-trial time windows fitted with the models, t-test analysis revealed significant changes in the model parameter difference between the players from the first 40 to the second 40 of the time windows (ps < 0.01) in all the distinct patterns except for the mutual rush pattern, as shown in Table 3. In particular, the players' difference of parameters significantly decreased for every parameter in the switching and the avoidance patterns. The temporal patterns of averaged parameter differences in the self-concept model and its corresponding BIC scores are depicted as a function of time progress in Figure 6. The difference of the parameters between the players in the self-concept model showed a strong correlation with BIC scores for most of the parameters (see Table 4). Mostly, the BIC scores decreased with decreasing difference in the parameters (positive correlation). However, the initial benevolence parameter (β) in the mutual rush and unfair patterns had no significant correlation with the BIC scores. Although the results of the non-stationary parameter analysis for Cox et al.'s model was similar to that of the self-concept model, there were seven parameters with no significant correlation with BIC score in Cox et al.'s model, while there were five in the self-concept model.


Self-concept in fairness and rule establishment during a competitive game: a computational approach.

Lee SH, Kim SP, Cho YS - Front Psychol (2015)

Differences of the parameters between two players in the self-concept model as a function of time progress. The dashed line represents the additive inverse of the log likelihood value (-logL), which is proportional to the BIC score (see Equation 12).
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4561810&req=5

Figure 6: Differences of the parameters between two players in the self-concept model as a function of time progress. The dashed line represents the additive inverse of the log likelihood value (-logL), which is proportional to the BIC score (see Equation 12).
Mentions: For Cox et al.'s model and the self-concept model, which appeared to explain the behavior patterns better than the baseline, the non-stationary parameter analysis was conducted. Among the 81 sets of 20-trial time windows fitted with the models, t-test analysis revealed significant changes in the model parameter difference between the players from the first 40 to the second 40 of the time windows (ps < 0.01) in all the distinct patterns except for the mutual rush pattern, as shown in Table 3. In particular, the players' difference of parameters significantly decreased for every parameter in the switching and the avoidance patterns. The temporal patterns of averaged parameter differences in the self-concept model and its corresponding BIC scores are depicted as a function of time progress in Figure 6. The difference of the parameters between the players in the self-concept model showed a strong correlation with BIC scores for most of the parameters (see Table 4). Mostly, the BIC scores decreased with decreasing difference in the parameters (positive correlation). However, the initial benevolence parameter (β) in the mutual rush and unfair patterns had no significant correlation with the BIC scores. Although the results of the non-stationary parameter analysis for Cox et al.'s model was similar to that of the self-concept model, there were seven parameters with no significant correlation with BIC score in Cox et al.'s model, while there were five in the self-concept model.

Bottom Line: When the models were fitted to a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with "switching" and "mutual avoidance" patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game.In contrast, the difference of parameters between the players in the "unfair" and "mutual rush" patterns did not become stable.The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, Korea University Seoul, South Korea.

ABSTRACT
People consider fairness as well as their own interest when making decisions in economic games. The present study proposes a model that encompasses the self-concept determined by one's own kindness as a factor of fairness. To observe behavioral patterns that reflect self-concept and fairness, a chicken game experiment was conducted. Behavioral data demonstrates four distinct patterns; "switching," "mutual rush," "mutual avoidance," and "unfair" patterns. Model estimation of chicken game data shows that a model with self-concept predicts those behaviors better than previous models of fairness, suggesting that self-concept indeed affects human behavior in competitive economic games. Moreover, a non-stationary parameter analysis revealed the process of reaching consensus between the players in a game. When the models were fitted to a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with "switching" and "mutual avoidance" patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game. In contrast, the difference of parameters between the players in the "unfair" and "mutual rush" patterns did not become stable. The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.

No MeSH data available.