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The Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: An Individual Level Betrayal Aversion Measure.

Aimone J, Ball S, King-Casas B - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: This paper develops a new task to elicit an individual's level of betrayal aversion that can then be compared to individual characteristics.We demonstrate the feasibility of our new task and show that our aggregate individual results are consistent with previous studies.While we find risk aversion and betrayal aversion have no significant relationship, we do observe that risk aversion is correlated with non-social risk preferences, but not the social, betrayal related, risk component of the new task.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Economics, Hankamer School of Business, Baylor University, Waco, Texas, United States of America; Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, Virginia Tech, Roanoke, Virginia, United States of America.

ABSTRACT
Research on betrayal aversion shows that individuals' response to risk depends not only on probabilities and payoffs, but also on whether the risk includes a betrayal of trust. While previous studies focus on measuring aggregate levels of betrayal aversion, the connection between an individual's own betrayal aversion and other individually varying factors, including risk preferences, are currently unexplored. This paper develops a new task to elicit an individual's level of betrayal aversion that can then be compared to individual characteristics. We demonstrate the feasibility of our new task and show that our aggregate individual results are consistent with previous studies. We then use this classification to ask whether betrayal aversion is correlated with risk aversion. While we find risk aversion and betrayal aversion have no significant relationship, we do observe that risk aversion is correlated with non-social risk preferences, but not the social, betrayal related, risk component of the new task.

No MeSH data available.


Extensive form representation of the two games in the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: a) the Trust Game; b) the Risk-Only Trust Game.In the Trust game (Risk-Only Trust Game), the first move is made by the investor. If the investor chooses Don't Trust (No Gamble) the game ends and each participant earns $10, otherwise the Trustee makes a choice of Reciprocate or Betray (Nature/Chance determines the outcome). Note the probability that nature/chance chooses “Even” in Game 2 is identical to the actual probability that the investor has of being randomly matched with a trustee who chose “Reciprocate” in Game 1.
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pone.0137491.g001: Extensive form representation of the two games in the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: a) the Trust Game; b) the Risk-Only Trust Game.In the Trust game (Risk-Only Trust Game), the first move is made by the investor. If the investor chooses Don't Trust (No Gamble) the game ends and each participant earns $10, otherwise the Trustee makes a choice of Reciprocate or Betray (Nature/Chance determines the outcome). Note the probability that nature/chance chooses “Even” in Game 2 is identical to the actual probability that the investor has of being randomly matched with a trustee who chose “Reciprocate” in Game 1.

Mentions: We draw elements from the betrayal aversion studies of [2] and [14] to develop a novel elicitation procedure that allows us to identify individual preferences. The Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task (BAET) includes two games. Game 1 is a binary one-shot trust game (Fig 1A). Game 2 is a risk-only game which retains the structure and payoffs of the one-shot trust game, but replaces the second stage decision made by the trustee with a random decision (Fig 1B).


The Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: An Individual Level Betrayal Aversion Measure.

Aimone J, Ball S, King-Casas B - PLoS ONE (2015)

Extensive form representation of the two games in the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: a) the Trust Game; b) the Risk-Only Trust Game.In the Trust game (Risk-Only Trust Game), the first move is made by the investor. If the investor chooses Don't Trust (No Gamble) the game ends and each participant earns $10, otherwise the Trustee makes a choice of Reciprocate or Betray (Nature/Chance determines the outcome). Note the probability that nature/chance chooses “Even” in Game 2 is identical to the actual probability that the investor has of being randomly matched with a trustee who chose “Reciprocate” in Game 1.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

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Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4557997&req=5

pone.0137491.g001: Extensive form representation of the two games in the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task: a) the Trust Game; b) the Risk-Only Trust Game.In the Trust game (Risk-Only Trust Game), the first move is made by the investor. If the investor chooses Don't Trust (No Gamble) the game ends and each participant earns $10, otherwise the Trustee makes a choice of Reciprocate or Betray (Nature/Chance determines the outcome). Note the probability that nature/chance chooses “Even” in Game 2 is identical to the actual probability that the investor has of being randomly matched with a trustee who chose “Reciprocate” in Game 1.
Mentions: We draw elements from the betrayal aversion studies of [2] and [14] to develop a novel elicitation procedure that allows us to identify individual preferences. The Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task (BAET) includes two games. Game 1 is a binary one-shot trust game (Fig 1A). Game 2 is a risk-only game which retains the structure and payoffs of the one-shot trust game, but replaces the second stage decision made by the trustee with a random decision (Fig 1B).

Bottom Line: This paper develops a new task to elicit an individual's level of betrayal aversion that can then be compared to individual characteristics.We demonstrate the feasibility of our new task and show that our aggregate individual results are consistent with previous studies.While we find risk aversion and betrayal aversion have no significant relationship, we do observe that risk aversion is correlated with non-social risk preferences, but not the social, betrayal related, risk component of the new task.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Economics, Hankamer School of Business, Baylor University, Waco, Texas, United States of America; Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute, Virginia Tech, Roanoke, Virginia, United States of America.

ABSTRACT
Research on betrayal aversion shows that individuals' response to risk depends not only on probabilities and payoffs, but also on whether the risk includes a betrayal of trust. While previous studies focus on measuring aggregate levels of betrayal aversion, the connection between an individual's own betrayal aversion and other individually varying factors, including risk preferences, are currently unexplored. This paper develops a new task to elicit an individual's level of betrayal aversion that can then be compared to individual characteristics. We demonstrate the feasibility of our new task and show that our aggregate individual results are consistent with previous studies. We then use this classification to ask whether betrayal aversion is correlated with risk aversion. While we find risk aversion and betrayal aversion have no significant relationship, we do observe that risk aversion is correlated with non-social risk preferences, but not the social, betrayal related, risk component of the new task.

No MeSH data available.