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Preserving Smart Objects Privacy through Anonymous and Accountable Access Control for a M2M-Enabled Internet of Things.

Hernández-Ramos JL, Bernabe JB, Moreno MV, Skarmeta AF - Sensors (Basel) (2015)

Bottom Line: This work proposes different privacy-preserving mechanisms through the application of anonymous credential systems and certificateless public key cryptography.The resulting alternatives are intended to enable an anonymous and accountable access control approach to be deployed on large-scale scenarios, such as Smart Cities.Furthermore, the proposed mechanisms have been deployed on constrained devices, in order to assess their suitability for a secure and privacy-preserving M2M-enabled Internet of Things.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Information and Communications Engineering, Computer Science Faculty, University of Murcia, Murcia 30100, Spain. jluis.hernandez@um.es.

ABSTRACT
As we get into the Internet of Things era, security and privacy concerns remain as the main obstacles in the development of innovative and valuable services to be exploited by society. Given the Machine-to-Machine (M2M) nature of these emerging scenarios, the application of current privacy-friendly technologies needs to be reconsidered and adapted to be deployed in such global ecosystem. This work proposes different privacy-preserving mechanisms through the application of anonymous credential systems and certificateless public key cryptography. The resulting alternatives are intended to enable an anonymous and accountable access control approach to be deployed on large-scale scenarios, such as Smart Cities. Furthermore, the proposed mechanisms have been deployed on constrained devices, in order to assess their suitability for a secure and privacy-preserving M2M-enabled Internet of Things.

No MeSH data available.


Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based Anonymous DCapBAC interactions.
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f4-sensors-15-15611: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based Anonymous DCapBAC interactions.

Mentions: In this alternative, an Anonymous DCapBAC token, along with a CP-ABE key are used to demonstrate the possession of a certain authorization credential, while privacy of the requester smart object is still preserved. As shown in Figure 4, three main stages are differentiated for this approach. Firstly, a smart object, acting as a subject entity, obtains a CP-ABE key SKA associated to a set of identity attributes A (message 1–3). This phase requires an explicit authentication process by which the subject device proves that it has a certain set of attributes (e.g., those attributes contained in its X.509 certificate). In this case, we propose to use CoAP-DTLS exchange in order to deliver the CP-ABE key over a secure channel. However, unlike the previous approach, in which a new IBE key is generated for each token, it should be pointed out that this process is required only once (or in the case the CP-ABE key has expired or has been revoked).


Preserving Smart Objects Privacy through Anonymous and Accountable Access Control for a M2M-Enabled Internet of Things.

Hernández-Ramos JL, Bernabe JB, Moreno MV, Skarmeta AF - Sensors (Basel) (2015)

Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based Anonymous DCapBAC interactions.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4541847&req=5

f4-sensors-15-15611: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) based Anonymous DCapBAC interactions.
Mentions: In this alternative, an Anonymous DCapBAC token, along with a CP-ABE key are used to demonstrate the possession of a certain authorization credential, while privacy of the requester smart object is still preserved. As shown in Figure 4, three main stages are differentiated for this approach. Firstly, a smart object, acting as a subject entity, obtains a CP-ABE key SKA associated to a set of identity attributes A (message 1–3). This phase requires an explicit authentication process by which the subject device proves that it has a certain set of attributes (e.g., those attributes contained in its X.509 certificate). In this case, we propose to use CoAP-DTLS exchange in order to deliver the CP-ABE key over a secure channel. However, unlike the previous approach, in which a new IBE key is generated for each token, it should be pointed out that this process is required only once (or in the case the CP-ABE key has expired or has been revoked).

Bottom Line: This work proposes different privacy-preserving mechanisms through the application of anonymous credential systems and certificateless public key cryptography.The resulting alternatives are intended to enable an anonymous and accountable access control approach to be deployed on large-scale scenarios, such as Smart Cities.Furthermore, the proposed mechanisms have been deployed on constrained devices, in order to assess their suitability for a secure and privacy-preserving M2M-enabled Internet of Things.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Information and Communications Engineering, Computer Science Faculty, University of Murcia, Murcia 30100, Spain. jluis.hernandez@um.es.

ABSTRACT
As we get into the Internet of Things era, security and privacy concerns remain as the main obstacles in the development of innovative and valuable services to be exploited by society. Given the Machine-to-Machine (M2M) nature of these emerging scenarios, the application of current privacy-friendly technologies needs to be reconsidered and adapted to be deployed in such global ecosystem. This work proposes different privacy-preserving mechanisms through the application of anonymous credential systems and certificateless public key cryptography. The resulting alternatives are intended to enable an anonymous and accountable access control approach to be deployed on large-scale scenarios, such as Smart Cities. Furthermore, the proposed mechanisms have been deployed on constrained devices, in order to assess their suitability for a secure and privacy-preserving M2M-enabled Internet of Things.

No MeSH data available.