Limits...
"Who Doesn't?"--The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption.

Köbis NC, van Prooijen JW, Righetti F, Van Lange PA - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior--both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption.Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3).Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Corruption poses one of the major societal challenges of our time. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. In order to explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, we explored the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. We conducted three studies to test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior--both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game. These findings indicate that perceived descriptive norms can impact corrupt behavior and, possibly, could offer an explanation for inter-personal and inter-cultural variation in corrupt behavior in the real world. We discuss implications of these findings and draw avenues for future research.

No MeSH data available.


Triadic structure of the corruption game.Participants take the role of the potentially corrupt player.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4487686&req=5

pone.0131830.g001: Triadic structure of the corruption game.Participants take the role of the potentially corrupt player.

Mentions: The corruption game entails three players. In an auction fashion, two players compete for a total prize of 120 credits. The third player administers the prize to the highest bidder (see Fig 1). Each round both competing players receive a budget of 50 credits to make bids. The competing players can choose from an array of options, which range from not bidding at all (0 credits) to bidding their entire budget for the round (50 credits). The competing players keep the credits that they do not allocate in a bid. While the highest bidder wins the total prize, in case of both players offering the same bid, the prize is split equally between the two. The bidding process lasts for five rounds.


"Who Doesn't?"--The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption.

Köbis NC, van Prooijen JW, Righetti F, Van Lange PA - PLoS ONE (2015)

Triadic structure of the corruption game.Participants take the role of the potentially corrupt player.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4487686&req=5

pone.0131830.g001: Triadic structure of the corruption game.Participants take the role of the potentially corrupt player.
Mentions: The corruption game entails three players. In an auction fashion, two players compete for a total prize of 120 credits. The third player administers the prize to the highest bidder (see Fig 1). Each round both competing players receive a budget of 50 credits to make bids. The competing players can choose from an array of options, which range from not bidding at all (0 credits) to bidding their entire budget for the round (50 credits). The competing players keep the credits that they do not allocate in a bid. While the highest bidder wins the total prize, in case of both players offering the same bid, the prize is split equally between the two. The bidding process lasts for five rounds.

Bottom Line: The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior--both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption.Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3).Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Corruption poses one of the major societal challenges of our time. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. In order to explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, we explored the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. We conducted three studies to test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior--both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game. These findings indicate that perceived descriptive norms can impact corrupt behavior and, possibly, could offer an explanation for inter-personal and inter-cultural variation in corrupt behavior in the real world. We discuss implications of these findings and draw avenues for future research.

No MeSH data available.