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How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Ramazi P, Hessel J, Cao M - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix.According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population.However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: ENgineering and TEchnology institute Groningen (ENTEG), Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

No MeSH data available.


Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and 2000 iterations per simulation with the initial number of cooperators set to 20 (blue) and 50 (magenta) with a1 = 100 and a2, a3 = 1 and when r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0.
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pone.0122205.g011: Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and 2000 iterations per simulation with the initial number of cooperators set to 20 (blue) and 50 (magenta) with a1 = 100 and a2, a3 = 1 and when r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0.

Mentions: Now, with such a varying betrayal for each of the agents, we simulate the varying emotion game for a population of 100 agents, with the parameters r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0 in the payoff matrix Ai and for all i. The evolution of the percentage of cooperators for different initial number of cooperators is shown in Figs 10 and 11.


How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Ramazi P, Hessel J, Cao M - PLoS ONE (2015)

Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and 2000 iterations per simulation with the initial number of cooperators set to 20 (blue) and 50 (magenta) with a1 = 100 and a2, a3 = 1 and when r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0.
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Related In: Results  -  Collection

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Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4414597&req=5

pone.0122205.g011: Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and 2000 iterations per simulation with the initial number of cooperators set to 20 (blue) and 50 (magenta) with a1 = 100 and a2, a3 = 1 and when r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0.
Mentions: Now, with such a varying betrayal for each of the agents, we simulate the varying emotion game for a population of 100 agents, with the parameters r = 5, c = 1 and gi = 0 in the payoff matrix Ai and for all i. The evolution of the percentage of cooperators for different initial number of cooperators is shown in Figs 10 and 11.

Bottom Line: Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix.According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population.However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: ENgineering and TEchnology institute Groningen (ENTEG), Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

No MeSH data available.