Limits...
Can centralized sanctioning promote trust in social dilemmas? A two-level trust game with incomplete information.

Wang RY, Ng CN - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions.However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored.Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

ABSTRACT
The problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Extensive form of the Trust Game.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4400067&req=5

pone.0124513.g001: Extensive form of the Trust Game.

Mentions: Trust is a critical social factor which is considered to be highly conducive to preventing opportunistic behaviour, decreasing transaction costs and maintaining cooperation in human activities [1–5]. Traditional game theoretic analysis of trust is usually built upon a standard trust game as shown in Fig 1 [6–11]. In the trust game, “not placing trust” is the rational individual action in a one-shot game [12]. This is a suboptimal social outcome because “placing trust, honouring trust” is a strict improvement for both the trustor and the trustee. From this point of view, Fig 1 concisely illustrates a paradigmatic social dilemma in human society, where R1, S1, P1 denote the utility of the trustor and R2, T2, P2 denote the utility of the trustee.


Can centralized sanctioning promote trust in social dilemmas? A two-level trust game with incomplete information.

Wang RY, Ng CN - PLoS ONE (2015)

Extensive form of the Trust Game.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4400067&req=5

pone.0124513.g001: Extensive form of the Trust Game.
Mentions: Trust is a critical social factor which is considered to be highly conducive to preventing opportunistic behaviour, decreasing transaction costs and maintaining cooperation in human activities [1–5]. Traditional game theoretic analysis of trust is usually built upon a standard trust game as shown in Fig 1 [6–11]. In the trust game, “not placing trust” is the rational individual action in a one-shot game [12]. This is a suboptimal social outcome because “placing trust, honouring trust” is a strict improvement for both the trustor and the trustee. From this point of view, Fig 1 concisely illustrates a paradigmatic social dilemma in human society, where R1, S1, P1 denote the utility of the trustor and R2, T2, P2 denote the utility of the trustee.

Bottom Line: Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions.However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored.Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

ABSTRACT
The problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus