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Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?

Pascual-Ezama D, Dunfield D, Gil-Gómez de Liaño B, Prelec D - PLoS ONE (2015)

Bottom Line: First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1).Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker's self-image acting as a strong social incentives.Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals' behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Financial Economy and Accounting II, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain.

ABSTRACT
Recent empirical evidence shows that working in an unsupervised, isolated situation under competition, can increase dishonest behavior to achieve prestige. However, could working in a common space, in the presence of colleagues affect cheating? Here, we examine how familiar-peer influence, supervision and social incentives affect worker performance and dishonest behavior. First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1). Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker's self-image acting as a strong social incentives. Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals' behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).

No MeSH data available.


Number of sheets declared in the HS, LS, and NS conditions.Number of units reported in different supervision situations when participants are in isolated situations, or when the task is done individually but in the presence of other people (with or without confederates’ manipulations).
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pone.0122305.g001: Number of sheets declared in the HS, LS, and NS conditions.Number of units reported in different supervision situations when participants are in isolated situations, or when the task is done individually but in the presence of other people (with or without confederates’ manipulations).

Mentions: Again, mean number of units declared in all conditions is reported in Table 1. The one-way ANOVA on Supervision showed a significant main effect [F(2,61) = 5.21; p = .008; η2 = .15], contrary to results found in previous experiments. Specifically, differences were found between HS with both LS (p = .03) and NS (p = .01). That is, performance was reduced in HS compared to the other conditions. Moreover, it is the first condition among the three experiments where errors can be found while doing the task (see Table 1 for TL). Running a 3x4 ANOVA including all experiments with Supervision (HS, LS and NS) and Presence of Others (I, FP, L and TL) we only found a main effect of the Interaction [F(6,256) = 3.24; p = .004; η2 = .071]. The differences showed up only in HS between TL and the rest of the situations I (p = .002), FP (p <.001) and L (p = .005). As shown in Fig 1, for HS there is a significant reduction in units declared for TL, compared to the other situations (I, FP and L). In general, it seems that the presence of a Triple Lure affects performance under high supervision by reducing accuracy and increasing errors.


Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?

Pascual-Ezama D, Dunfield D, Gil-Gómez de Liaño B, Prelec D - PLoS ONE (2015)

Number of sheets declared in the HS, LS, and NS conditions.Number of units reported in different supervision situations when participants are in isolated situations, or when the task is done individually but in the presence of other people (with or without confederates’ manipulations).
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4390288&req=5

pone.0122305.g001: Number of sheets declared in the HS, LS, and NS conditions.Number of units reported in different supervision situations when participants are in isolated situations, or when the task is done individually but in the presence of other people (with or without confederates’ manipulations).
Mentions: Again, mean number of units declared in all conditions is reported in Table 1. The one-way ANOVA on Supervision showed a significant main effect [F(2,61) = 5.21; p = .008; η2 = .15], contrary to results found in previous experiments. Specifically, differences were found between HS with both LS (p = .03) and NS (p = .01). That is, performance was reduced in HS compared to the other conditions. Moreover, it is the first condition among the three experiments where errors can be found while doing the task (see Table 1 for TL). Running a 3x4 ANOVA including all experiments with Supervision (HS, LS and NS) and Presence of Others (I, FP, L and TL) we only found a main effect of the Interaction [F(6,256) = 3.24; p = .004; η2 = .071]. The differences showed up only in HS between TL and the rest of the situations I (p = .002), FP (p <.001) and L (p = .005). As shown in Fig 1, for HS there is a significant reduction in units declared for TL, compared to the other situations (I, FP and L). In general, it seems that the presence of a Triple Lure affects performance under high supervision by reducing accuracy and increasing errors.

Bottom Line: First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1).Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker's self-image acting as a strong social incentives.Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals' behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Financial Economy and Accounting II, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain.

ABSTRACT
Recent empirical evidence shows that working in an unsupervised, isolated situation under competition, can increase dishonest behavior to achieve prestige. However, could working in a common space, in the presence of colleagues affect cheating? Here, we examine how familiar-peer influence, supervision and social incentives affect worker performance and dishonest behavior. First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1). Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker's self-image acting as a strong social incentives. Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals' behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).

No MeSH data available.