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Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937.

Aidt TS, Mooney G - J Public Econ (2014)

Bottom Line: We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937).We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage.Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.

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Affiliation: Faculty of Economics, Jesus College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT

We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937). We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage. Taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs. Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.

No MeSH data available.


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The PBC in expenditure outcomes, 1902–1914.
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f0055: The PBC in expenditure outcomes, 1902–1914.

Mentions: Before we turn to the formal statistical analysis, we present some descriptive evidence on the nature of the opportunistic political budget cycle in London between 1902 and 1937. Figs. 7–10 show plots of the seven fiscal outcome variables in “event time”. That is, each figure shows the average of the relevant fiscal outcome in election years, one year before an election and one year after an election. A “V” or an inverted “V” shape indicates a political budget cycle. We observe a clear revenue pattern under taxpayer suffrage: lower current income and lower rate income in election years than in other years (Fig. 7). We note a fall in spending for both administration and current expenditure (Fig. 8). The pattern is noticeably different under universal suffrage (Figs. 9 and 10). The budget cycle in rate income has gone. Instead, we observe a clear election year increase in capital expenditure with a hint of a cycle in current income. Under both franchise regimes, surpluses are lower in election years.


Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937.

Aidt TS, Mooney G - J Public Econ (2014)

The PBC in expenditure outcomes, 1902–1914.
© Copyright Policy - CC BY
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4375611&req=5

f0055: The PBC in expenditure outcomes, 1902–1914.
Mentions: Before we turn to the formal statistical analysis, we present some descriptive evidence on the nature of the opportunistic political budget cycle in London between 1902 and 1937. Figs. 7–10 show plots of the seven fiscal outcome variables in “event time”. That is, each figure shows the average of the relevant fiscal outcome in election years, one year before an election and one year after an election. A “V” or an inverted “V” shape indicates a political budget cycle. We observe a clear revenue pattern under taxpayer suffrage: lower current income and lower rate income in election years than in other years (Fig. 7). We note a fall in spending for both administration and current expenditure (Fig. 8). The pattern is noticeably different under universal suffrage (Figs. 9 and 10). The budget cycle in rate income has gone. Instead, we observe a clear election year increase in capital expenditure with a hint of a cycle in current income. Under both franchise regimes, surpluses are lower in election years.

Bottom Line: We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937).We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage.Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Economics, Jesus College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT

We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937). We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage. Taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs. Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus