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The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions.

Volz KG, Vogeley K, Tittgemeyer M, von Cramon DY, Sutter M - Front Behav Neurosci (2015)

Bottom Line: Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth-when the sender does not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message.Sophisticated deception triggers activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG.We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender's veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience Tübingen, Germany.

ABSTRACT
Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, and almost any other form of social interaction. Informational asymmetries may create incentives for the better-informed party to exploit her advantage by misrepresenting information. Using a game-theoretic setting, we investigate the neural basis of deception in human interaction. Unlike in most previous fMRI research on deception, the participants decide themselves whether to lie or not. We find activation within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the (pre)cuneus (CUN), and the anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) when contrasting lying with truth telling. Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth-when the sender does not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message. Sophisticated deception triggers activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG. We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender's veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.

No MeSH data available.


This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the world to the sender. Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix list all 90 games. Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are given for the three conditions “conflict” (A), “sender indifferent” (B), and “aligned interest” (C). The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either of two messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for you.” After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to answer the following question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column or the blue column?” Importantly, the sender's message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for both players in any of the states. Rather, the receiver's choice is eventually implemented for payment.
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Figure 1: This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the world to the sender. Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix list all 90 games. Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are given for the three conditions “conflict” (A), “sender indifferent” (B), and “aligned interest” (C). The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either of two messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for you.” After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to answer the following question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column or the blue column?” Importantly, the sender's message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for both players in any of the states. Rather, the receiver's choice is eventually implemented for payment.

Mentions: In the sender-receiver game, there are two players of which only the sender (the person being scanned) is informed about the monetary consequences for herself and the receiver for two different options, one being associated with Blue color and the other with Red color. Let Blue (Sb, Rb) represent the payoff to the sender and the receiver, respectively, from choosing Blue, and Red (Sr, Rr) from choosing Red (cp. Figure 1). After being informed about these pairs of payoffs, the sender sends a message to the receiver, saying either “Blue is more profitable for you” or “Red is more profitable for you.” After sending a message, the sender has to indicate on a new screen which state she expects the receiver to pick. Then the next trial started. All in all, 90 games were played that differed with respect to the relative gains and losses for the two players (see below).


The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions.

Volz KG, Vogeley K, Tittgemeyer M, von Cramon DY, Sutter M - Front Behav Neurosci (2015)

This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the world to the sender. Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix list all 90 games. Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are given for the three conditions “conflict” (A), “sender indifferent” (B), and “aligned interest” (C). The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either of two messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for you.” After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to answer the following question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column or the blue column?” Importantly, the sender's message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for both players in any of the states. Rather, the receiver's choice is eventually implemented for payment.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4325923&req=5

Figure 1: This is how we presented the payoffs in the two states of the world to the sender. Tables A1–A3 in the Appendix list all 90 games. Example matrices of the sender-receiver paradigm are given for the three conditions “conflict” (A), “sender indifferent” (B), and “aligned interest” (C). The sender is shown a specific payoff matrix and can send either of two messages: “Red is more profitable for you.” Or “Blue is more profitable for you.” After response selection and on the next screen, the participant has to answer the following question: “Which state do you expect the receiver to choose? The red column or the blue column?” Importantly, the sender's message does not have a direct impact on the payoffs for both players in any of the states. Rather, the receiver's choice is eventually implemented for payment.
Mentions: In the sender-receiver game, there are two players of which only the sender (the person being scanned) is informed about the monetary consequences for herself and the receiver for two different options, one being associated with Blue color and the other with Red color. Let Blue (Sb, Rb) represent the payoff to the sender and the receiver, respectively, from choosing Blue, and Red (Sr, Rr) from choosing Red (cp. Figure 1). After being informed about these pairs of payoffs, the sender sends a message to the receiver, saying either “Blue is more profitable for you” or “Red is more profitable for you.” After sending a message, the sender has to indicate on a new screen which state she expects the receiver to pick. Then the next trial started. All in all, 90 games were played that differed with respect to the relative gains and losses for the two players (see below).

Bottom Line: Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth-when the sender does not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message.Sophisticated deception triggers activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG.We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender's veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience Tübingen, Germany.

ABSTRACT
Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, and almost any other form of social interaction. Informational asymmetries may create incentives for the better-informed party to exploit her advantage by misrepresenting information. Using a game-theoretic setting, we investigate the neural basis of deception in human interaction. Unlike in most previous fMRI research on deception, the participants decide themselves whether to lie or not. We find activation within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the (pre)cuneus (CUN), and the anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) when contrasting lying with truth telling. Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth-when the sender does not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message. Sophisticated deception triggers activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG. We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender's veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.

No MeSH data available.