Limits...
The empirical study of norms is just what we are missing.

Achourioti T, Fugard AJ, Stenning K - Front Psychol (2014)

Bottom Line: A radical descriptivism which avoids norms never worked for any science; nor can it work for the psychology of reasoning.We argue that many formal systems are required for psychology: classical logic, non-monotonic logics, probability logics, relevance logic, and others.One of the hardest challenges is working out what goals reasoners have and choosing and tailoring the appropriate logics to model the norms those goals imply.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the goals people have when reasoning determine their own norms of reasoning. A radical descriptivism which avoids norms never worked for any science; nor can it work for the psychology of reasoning. Norms as we understand them are illustrated with examples from categorical syllogistic reasoning and the "new paradigm" of subjective probabilities. We argue that many formal systems are required for psychology: classical logic, non-monotonic logics, probability logics, relevance logic, and others. One of the hardest challenges is working out what goals reasoners have and choosing and tailoring the appropriate logics to model the norms those goals imply.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Two premise diagrams unified in the Euler's Circles system of Stenning and Yule (1997). The crosses mark non-empty subregions. In the unified diagram, the A and C circles must be arranged to create the maximum number of minimal sub-regions compatible with the premises. In this case the A and C circles must intersect. Crosses whose minimal sub-region in the premise diagram have been bisected in this unification operation are deleted. Remaining crosses mark minimal models, and thereby indicate classically valid conclusions.
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Figure 1: Two premise diagrams unified in the Euler's Circles system of Stenning and Yule (1997). The crosses mark non-empty subregions. In the unified diagram, the A and C circles must be arranged to create the maximum number of minimal sub-regions compatible with the premises. In this case the A and C circles must intersect. Crosses whose minimal sub-region in the premise diagram have been bisected in this unification operation are deleted. Remaining crosses mark minimal models, and thereby indicate classically valid conclusions.

Mentions: It is an immediate consequence that merely observing scores on the 64 syllogisms under different instructions in the conventional draw-a-conclusion task, will not tell us what logic a participant is reasoning with. We have to address the logical concepts that they have (for example, attitudes to conditionals with empty antecedents—more presently) and with them their processes of reasoning. We beg the reader's patience with some details which are important for understanding the role distinct goals (embodying distinct norms) play. We will use the diagrammatic methods this reference uses, though it also supplies analogous sentential ones. So for example, the syllogism All A are B. Some C are not B is represented by Figure 1.


The empirical study of norms is just what we are missing.

Achourioti T, Fugard AJ, Stenning K - Front Psychol (2014)

Two premise diagrams unified in the Euler's Circles system of Stenning and Yule (1997). The crosses mark non-empty subregions. In the unified diagram, the A and C circles must be arranged to create the maximum number of minimal sub-regions compatible with the premises. In this case the A and C circles must intersect. Crosses whose minimal sub-region in the premise diagram have been bisected in this unification operation are deleted. Remaining crosses mark minimal models, and thereby indicate classically valid conclusions.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4202778&req=5

Figure 1: Two premise diagrams unified in the Euler's Circles system of Stenning and Yule (1997). The crosses mark non-empty subregions. In the unified diagram, the A and C circles must be arranged to create the maximum number of minimal sub-regions compatible with the premises. In this case the A and C circles must intersect. Crosses whose minimal sub-region in the premise diagram have been bisected in this unification operation are deleted. Remaining crosses mark minimal models, and thereby indicate classically valid conclusions.
Mentions: It is an immediate consequence that merely observing scores on the 64 syllogisms under different instructions in the conventional draw-a-conclusion task, will not tell us what logic a participant is reasoning with. We have to address the logical concepts that they have (for example, attitudes to conditionals with empty antecedents—more presently) and with them their processes of reasoning. We beg the reader's patience with some details which are important for understanding the role distinct goals (embodying distinct norms) play. We will use the diagrammatic methods this reference uses, though it also supplies analogous sentential ones. So for example, the syllogism All A are B. Some C are not B is represented by Figure 1.

Bottom Line: A radical descriptivism which avoids norms never worked for any science; nor can it work for the psychology of reasoning.We argue that many formal systems are required for psychology: classical logic, non-monotonic logics, probability logics, relevance logic, and others.One of the hardest challenges is working out what goals reasoners have and choosing and tailoring the appropriate logics to model the norms those goals imply.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the goals people have when reasoning determine their own norms of reasoning. A radical descriptivism which avoids norms never worked for any science; nor can it work for the psychology of reasoning. Norms as we understand them are illustrated with examples from categorical syllogistic reasoning and the "new paradigm" of subjective probabilities. We argue that many formal systems are required for psychology: classical logic, non-monotonic logics, probability logics, relevance logic, and others. One of the hardest challenges is working out what goals reasoners have and choosing and tailoring the appropriate logics to model the norms those goals imply.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus