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The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?

Hahn U - Front Psychol (2014)

Bottom Line: Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling.More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality.At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychological Sciences, Centre for Cognition, Computation, and Modelling, Birkbeck, University of London London, UK.

ABSTRACT
A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality. At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition.

No MeSH data available.


The figure presents examples of applications of Bayesian modeling. The examples, discussed in the text, reflect both different types of application in terms of the aspect of the cognitive system modeled, and the theoretical and methodological role accorded to Bayesian inference as a result.
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Figure 1: The figure presents examples of applications of Bayesian modeling. The examples, discussed in the text, reflect both different types of application in terms of the aspect of the cognitive system modeled, and the theoretical and methodological role accorded to Bayesian inference as a result.

Mentions: For these purposes it is important to consider a broad range of examples. Figure 1 contains a set of such examples, chosen with diversity in mind. The list contains both some of the most famous and influential Bayesian modeling (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Oaksford and Chater, 1994) and other examples, which, by comparison, are completely obscure (e.g., Harris and Hahn, 2009). The examples vary also in the cognitive domain to which the model is applied, ranging from judgment through reasoning and argumentation to categorization and language acquisition.


The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?

Hahn U - Front Psychol (2014)

The figure presents examples of applications of Bayesian modeling. The examples, discussed in the text, reflect both different types of application in terms of the aspect of the cognitive system modeled, and the theoretical and methodological role accorded to Bayesian inference as a result.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4126207&req=5

Figure 1: The figure presents examples of applications of Bayesian modeling. The examples, discussed in the text, reflect both different types of application in terms of the aspect of the cognitive system modeled, and the theoretical and methodological role accorded to Bayesian inference as a result.
Mentions: For these purposes it is important to consider a broad range of examples. Figure 1 contains a set of such examples, chosen with diversity in mind. The list contains both some of the most famous and influential Bayesian modeling (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Oaksford and Chater, 1994) and other examples, which, by comparison, are completely obscure (e.g., Harris and Hahn, 2009). The examples vary also in the cognitive domain to which the model is applied, ranging from judgment through reasoning and argumentation to categorization and language acquisition.

Bottom Line: Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling.More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality.At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychological Sciences, Centre for Cognition, Computation, and Modelling, Birkbeck, University of London London, UK.

ABSTRACT
A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality. At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition.

No MeSH data available.