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Learning with repeated-game strategies.

Ioannou CA, Romero J - Front Neurosci (2014)

Bottom Line: In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences.In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences.Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Southampton Southampton, UK.

ABSTRACT
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences. Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Stag hunt.
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Figure 9: Stag hunt.

Mentions: Figure 9A shows that in the Stag-Hunt game, the small percentage of pairs that took more than 5000 periods to converge predominately play automata which alternate between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This is confirmed in plot (b) as the frequency of the two Nash equilibria is roughly the same. However, this is only a small percentage of the data since about 80% of the pairs converged quickly in less than 5000 periods. Those pairs that converge quickly appear to pick one of the cooperative automata (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) from the beginning, which leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.


Learning with repeated-game strategies.

Ioannou CA, Romero J - Front Neurosci (2014)

Stag hunt.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4115627&req=5

Figure 9: Stag hunt.
Mentions: Figure 9A shows that in the Stag-Hunt game, the small percentage of pairs that took more than 5000 periods to converge predominately play automata which alternate between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This is confirmed in plot (b) as the frequency of the two Nash equilibria is roughly the same. However, this is only a small percentage of the data since about 80% of the pairs converged quickly in less than 5000 periods. Those pairs that converge quickly appear to pick one of the cooperative automata (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) from the beginning, which leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.

Bottom Line: In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences.In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences.Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Southampton Southampton, UK.

ABSTRACT
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences. Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus