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Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective.

Wenmackers S, Vanpoucke DE, Douven I - Front Psychol (2014)

Bottom Line: Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality.In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states.Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen Groningen, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

No MeSH data available.


Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of four agents (N = 4). We show the same face of the OPS for D = 0 (left), D = 1 (middle), and D = 2 (right).
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Figure 5: Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of four agents (N = 4). We show the same face of the OPS for D = 0 (left), D = 1 (middle), and D = 2 (right).

Mentions: Figure 5 shows the opinion dynamics for a population of four agents. Although there are more points in this OPS, the results are comparable to those for N = 3: there is no dynamics for D = 0, and there is an asymmetry for D = 1 that is absent for D = 2. The three vertices are sinks and each of the three points at the middle of an edge is a source.


Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective.

Wenmackers S, Vanpoucke DE, Douven I - Front Psychol (2014)

Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of four agents (N = 4). We show the same face of the OPS for D = 0 (left), D = 1 (middle), and D = 2 (right).
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4061898&req=5

Figure 5: Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of four agents (N = 4). We show the same face of the OPS for D = 0 (left), D = 1 (middle), and D = 2 (right).
Mentions: Figure 5 shows the opinion dynamics for a population of four agents. Although there are more points in this OPS, the results are comparable to those for N = 3: there is no dynamics for D = 0, and there is an asymmetry for D = 1 that is absent for D = 2. The three vertices are sinks and each of the three points at the middle of an edge is a source.

Bottom Line: Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality.In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states.Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen Groningen, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

No MeSH data available.