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Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective.

Wenmackers S, Vanpoucke DE, Douven I - Front Psychol (2014)

Bottom Line: Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality.In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states.Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen Groningen, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of two agents (N = 2). One face of the OPS is shown. Irrespective of the value of the threshold D (D is equal to 0, 1, or 2), all opinion profiles are fixed points (including the ones not shown).
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Figure 2: Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of two agents (N = 2). One face of the OPS is shown. Irrespective of the value of the threshold D (D is equal to 0, 1, or 2), all opinion profiles are fixed points (including the ones not shown).

Mentions: We will represent the dynamics on the OPS by arrows that point from an initial opinion profile toward the corresponding final state. For the sake of illustration, we consider populations in which none of the agents hold theory 01, so that we can limit ourselves to one face of the OPS. First, suppose that there are just two agents. In this case, there is no dynamics, irrespective of the value for D. (After all, when the average is exactly equal to 1/2, the corresponding bit keeps its initial value. Hence, an agent can never be swayed by a single peer and vice versa.) This situation is illustrated in Figure 2: all the opinion profiles are fixed points, so there are no arrows connecting any of them.


Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective.

Wenmackers S, Vanpoucke DE, Douven I - Front Psychol (2014)

Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of two agents (N = 2). One face of the OPS is shown. Irrespective of the value of the threshold D (D is equal to 0, 1, or 2), all opinion profiles are fixed points (including the ones not shown).
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4061898&req=5

Figure 2: Opinion dynamics for theories in a language with one atomic proposition (M = 1) and a population consisting of two agents (N = 2). One face of the OPS is shown. Irrespective of the value of the threshold D (D is equal to 0, 1, or 2), all opinion profiles are fixed points (including the ones not shown).
Mentions: We will represent the dynamics on the OPS by arrows that point from an initial opinion profile toward the corresponding final state. For the sake of illustration, we consider populations in which none of the agents hold theory 01, so that we can limit ourselves to one face of the OPS. First, suppose that there are just two agents. In this case, there is no dynamics, irrespective of the value for D. (After all, when the average is exactly equal to 1/2, the corresponding bit keeps its initial value. Hence, an agent can never be swayed by a single peer and vice versa.) This situation is illustrated in Figure 2: all the opinion profiles are fixed points, so there are no arrows connecting any of them.

Bottom Line: Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality.In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states.Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen Groningen, Netherlands.

ABSTRACT
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus