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The "id" knows more than the "ego" admits: neuropsychoanalytic and primal consciousness perspectives on the interface between affective and cognitive neuroscience.

Solms M, Panksepp J - Brain Sci (2012)

Bottom Line: These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness.From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness.The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town 7701, South Africa. Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za.

ABSTRACT
It is commonly believed that consciousness is a higher brain function. Here we consider the likelihood, based on abundant neuroevolutionary data that lower brain affective phenomenal experiences provide the "energy" for the developmental construction of higher forms of cognitive consciousness. This view is concordant with many of the theoretical formulations of Sigmund Freud. In this reconceptualization, all of consciousness may be dependent on the original evolution of affective phenomenal experiences that coded survival values. These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness. From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness. Within this view, although all individual neural activities are unconscious, perhaps along with secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, the primal sub-neocortical networks of emotions and other primal affects may have served as the sentient scaffolding for the construction of resolved perceptual and higher mental activities within the neocortex. The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus

A typical hydranencephalic brain. (Reprinted with permission of the American College of Radiology [40]. No other representation of this material is authorized without expressed, written permission from the American College of Radiology).
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brainsci-02-00147-f007: A typical hydranencephalic brain. (Reprinted with permission of the American College of Radiology [40]. No other representation of this material is authorized without expressed, written permission from the American College of Radiology).

Mentions: This case disproves only Craig’s restricted (insular) version of the corticocentric theory. What about the rest of the cortex? In preclinical animal models, the removal of the neocortex has long been known to spare emotionality. Indeed, not only are the rewarding effects of subcortical brain stimulations demonstrably preserved in decorticated creatures, these animals are actually more emotional than normal [37,38]. The most strikingly concordant human evidence to emerge in recent years, relevant to this broader question, concerns a condition called hydranencephaly, in which the cerebral cortex as a whole is destroyed in utero (usually due to infarction in the entire territory of the anterior cerebral circulation) [39]. Autopsy studies reveal that islands of cortex which may be preserved in such cases (see Figure 7) are functionally disconnected from the thalamus due to destruction of the linking white matter. The surviving cortical fragments are also gliotic, and therefore completely non-functional. This is confirmed by the clinical observation that, although visual cortex is preserved, the patients are blind [3]. However, the subcortical networks are functional; thus, the children are markedly emotionally functional human beings (see Figure 8).


The "id" knows more than the "ego" admits: neuropsychoanalytic and primal consciousness perspectives on the interface between affective and cognitive neuroscience.

Solms M, Panksepp J - Brain Sci (2012)

A typical hydranencephalic brain. (Reprinted with permission of the American College of Radiology [40]. No other representation of this material is authorized without expressed, written permission from the American College of Radiology).
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4061793&req=5

brainsci-02-00147-f007: A typical hydranencephalic brain. (Reprinted with permission of the American College of Radiology [40]. No other representation of this material is authorized without expressed, written permission from the American College of Radiology).
Mentions: This case disproves only Craig’s restricted (insular) version of the corticocentric theory. What about the rest of the cortex? In preclinical animal models, the removal of the neocortex has long been known to spare emotionality. Indeed, not only are the rewarding effects of subcortical brain stimulations demonstrably preserved in decorticated creatures, these animals are actually more emotional than normal [37,38]. The most strikingly concordant human evidence to emerge in recent years, relevant to this broader question, concerns a condition called hydranencephaly, in which the cerebral cortex as a whole is destroyed in utero (usually due to infarction in the entire territory of the anterior cerebral circulation) [39]. Autopsy studies reveal that islands of cortex which may be preserved in such cases (see Figure 7) are functionally disconnected from the thalamus due to destruction of the linking white matter. The surviving cortical fragments are also gliotic, and therefore completely non-functional. This is confirmed by the clinical observation that, although visual cortex is preserved, the patients are blind [3]. However, the subcortical networks are functional; thus, the children are markedly emotionally functional human beings (see Figure 8).

Bottom Line: These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness.From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness.The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town 7701, South Africa. Mark.Solms@uct.ac.za.

ABSTRACT
It is commonly believed that consciousness is a higher brain function. Here we consider the likelihood, based on abundant neuroevolutionary data that lower brain affective phenomenal experiences provide the "energy" for the developmental construction of higher forms of cognitive consciousness. This view is concordant with many of the theoretical formulations of Sigmund Freud. In this reconceptualization, all of consciousness may be dependent on the original evolution of affective phenomenal experiences that coded survival values. These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness. From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness. Within this view, although all individual neural activities are unconscious, perhaps along with secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, the primal sub-neocortical networks of emotions and other primal affects may have served as the sentient scaffolding for the construction of resolved perceptual and higher mental activities within the neocortex. The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models.

No MeSH data available.


Related in: MedlinePlus