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Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.

Ciampaglia GL, Lozano S, Helbing D - PLoS ONE (2014)

Bottom Line: In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG).We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically.Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia Center for Complex Networks and Systems Research, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America.

ABSTRACT
Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

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Related in: MedlinePlus

Acceptance rate as a function of proposed workload.Error bars are 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence intervals. We find monotonic acceptance rate, except for few hyperfair rejections.
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pone-0099039-g003: Acceptance rate as a function of proposed workload.Error bars are 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence intervals. We find monotonic acceptance rate, except for few hyperfair rejections.

Mentions: Introduction of power led to strong divergence from previously reported observations in the UG. Figure 3 shows the proportion of accepted offers as a function of the workload proposers offered to do. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers () were observed (lower bound of the 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence interval ). Here, all treatments are taken together. Moreover, there was a considerable amount of ‘hyperfair’ offers (), e.g. for . There were even offers for – the maximum allowed offer – and, looking at the responses to those offers, not all of them were accepted, which is very surprising.


Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.

Ciampaglia GL, Lozano S, Helbing D - PLoS ONE (2014)

Acceptance rate as a function of proposed workload.Error bars are 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence intervals. We find monotonic acceptance rate, except for few hyperfair rejections.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC4048244&req=5

pone-0099039-g003: Acceptance rate as a function of proposed workload.Error bars are 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence intervals. We find monotonic acceptance rate, except for few hyperfair rejections.
Mentions: Introduction of power led to strong divergence from previously reported observations in the UG. Figure 3 shows the proportion of accepted offers as a function of the workload proposers offered to do. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers () were observed (lower bound of the 95% Agresti-Coull approximate confidence interval ). Here, all treatments are taken together. Moreover, there was a considerable amount of ‘hyperfair’ offers (), e.g. for . There were even offers for – the maximum allowed offer – and, looking at the responses to those offers, not all of them were accepted, which is very surprising.

Bottom Line: In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG).We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically.Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia Center for Complex Networks and Systems Research, School of Informatics and Computing, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America.

ABSTRACT
Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

Show MeSH
Related in: MedlinePlus