Limits...
Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.


Endogenous versus random comparison, average unconditional contribution, multiple groups
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f7: Endogenous versus random comparison, average unconditional contribution, multiple groups

Mentions: Figure 7 compares average contributions in randomly sorted “control” sessions versus endogenously sorted regular sessions. Although price effects alone may have some effect, they seem relatively weak. In control sessions, overall rates of giving in both the first and second sacrifice round combined decline as expected from $4.2 in “High” sacrifice groups, to $3.4 in “Medium”, to $3.2 in “Low,” but no clear pattern stands out when rounds are analysed separately.37


Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Endogenous versus random comparison, average unconditional contribution, multiple groups
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3814943&req=5

f7: Endogenous versus random comparison, average unconditional contribution, multiple groups
Mentions: Figure 7 compares average contributions in randomly sorted “control” sessions versus endogenously sorted regular sessions. Although price effects alone may have some effect, they seem relatively weak. In control sessions, overall rates of giving in both the first and second sacrifice round combined decline as expected from $4.2 in “High” sacrifice groups, to $3.4 in “Medium”, to $3.2 in “Low,” but no clear pattern stands out when rounds are analysed separately.37

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.