Limits...
Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.


Average individual payout
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f6: Average individual payout

Mentions: Fewer infiltrators means greater welfare for other members. Prediction 4 implies that imperfect screening leads to reduced overall earnings in high-sacrifice groups relative to low sacrifice groups. But in the experiment, infiltrators are so few that high-sacrifice groups earn slightly more.33,34Figure 6 displays the average overall payouts to members of different groups across the spectrum of sacrifice. The negative trend is small but statistically significant in both first and second sacrifice rounds.35


Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Average individual payout
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3814943&req=5

f6: Average individual payout
Mentions: Fewer infiltrators means greater welfare for other members. Prediction 4 implies that imperfect screening leads to reduced overall earnings in high-sacrifice groups relative to low sacrifice groups. But in the experiment, infiltrators are so few that high-sacrifice groups earn slightly more.33,34Figure 6 displays the average overall payouts to members of different groups across the spectrum of sacrifice. The negative trend is small but statistically significant in both first and second sacrifice rounds.35

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.