Limits...
Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.


Subject “Types” and conditional contributions
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f3: Subject “Types” and conditional contributions

Mentions: Figure 3 plots the resulting average contribution schedules in the Normal VCM round. The classification scheme yields 48% conditional cooperators, 23% free-riders, 15% ‘hump-shaped' contributors, and 14% other. The pooled Sacrifice rounds yield a similar distribution of types with 52% conditional cooperators, 21% free-riders, 13% ‘hump-shaped' contributors, and 14% others. These distributions are remarkably similar to those obtained by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher et al. (2012).26


Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Aimone JA, Iannaccone LR, Makowsky MD, Rubin J - Rev Econ Stud (2013)

Subject “Types” and conditional contributions
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3814943&req=5

f3: Subject “Types” and conditional contributions
Mentions: Figure 3 plots the resulting average contribution schedules in the Normal VCM round. The classification scheme yields 48% conditional cooperators, 23% free-riders, 15% ‘hump-shaped' contributors, and 14% other. The pooled Sacrifice rounds yield a similar distribution of types with 52% conditional cooperators, 21% free-riders, 13% ‘hump-shaped' contributors, and 14% others. These distributions are remarkably similar to those obtained by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher et al. (2012).26

Bottom Line: Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment.Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare.The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute & Baylor University.

ABSTRACT
Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

No MeSH data available.