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Fairness overrides reputation: the importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation.

Güney S, Newell BR - Front Hum Neurosci (2013)

Bottom Line: In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important.In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation.We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Psychology, University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW, Australia.

ABSTRACT
Behavioral findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they think they are being treated unequally, even at the cost of minimizing their own material payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such non-self-regarding behavior, so-called, altruistic cooperation. In all of our studies, a mini ultimatum game was played either one-shot (in Experiment 1a and 1b) or repeatedly (Experiment 2), and rejections of inequitable distribution were taken as a measure of altruistic cooperation. In Experiment 1a, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation. We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer.

No MeSH data available.


Rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across rounds in each game in Experiment 2. Each bar in the figure represents percentage of Responders (out of 24) who rejected the (8/2) distribution in corresponding games. R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4, respectively. Error bars represent the 95% Confidence Interval.
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Figure 1: Rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across rounds in each game in Experiment 2. Each bar in the figure represents percentage of Responders (out of 24) who rejected the (8/2) distribution in corresponding games. R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4, respectively. Error bars represent the 95% Confidence Interval.

Mentions: We then investigated round by round rejection rates in all games of Experiment 2. The rationale of the round-wise analysis was (1) to investigate the reason behind the unexpectedly high levels of rejections in the (8/2) game, and (2) to see the effect of the possibility of RB and FI more clearly. We first focused on patterns (in rejections) indicating any type of signaling from the Responders to the Proposers, in terms of what Responders would not like to be offered. Even though it was possible to see the effect of RB and FI in all four rounds (i.e., because the players did not know how many rounds they would play in total nor when exactly they would switch partners, they should have incentive to build reputation for future interactions in all rounds), the rates of rejections of the (8/2) distribution were especially important in Round 1 and Round 3. Because the Responders would have a chance to give a message to their newly matched partners, they would (presumably) perceive these rounds (1 and 3) as the most suitable time to signal their preferences to their game partners for the following rounds. Figure 1 depicts the rejection rates (in percentages) of the (8/2) distribution across four rounds in each game of Experiment 2.


Fairness overrides reputation: the importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation.

Güney S, Newell BR - Front Hum Neurosci (2013)

Rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across rounds in each game in Experiment 2. Each bar in the figure represents percentage of Responders (out of 24) who rejected the (8/2) distribution in corresponding games. R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4, respectively. Error bars represent the 95% Confidence Interval.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3675330&req=5

Figure 1: Rejection rates of the (8/2) distribution across rounds in each game in Experiment 2. Each bar in the figure represents percentage of Responders (out of 24) who rejected the (8/2) distribution in corresponding games. R1, R2, R3, and R4 correspond to Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4, respectively. Error bars represent the 95% Confidence Interval.
Mentions: We then investigated round by round rejection rates in all games of Experiment 2. The rationale of the round-wise analysis was (1) to investigate the reason behind the unexpectedly high levels of rejections in the (8/2) game, and (2) to see the effect of the possibility of RB and FI more clearly. We first focused on patterns (in rejections) indicating any type of signaling from the Responders to the Proposers, in terms of what Responders would not like to be offered. Even though it was possible to see the effect of RB and FI in all four rounds (i.e., because the players did not know how many rounds they would play in total nor when exactly they would switch partners, they should have incentive to build reputation for future interactions in all rounds), the rates of rejections of the (8/2) distribution were especially important in Round 1 and Round 3. Because the Responders would have a chance to give a message to their newly matched partners, they would (presumably) perceive these rounds (1 and 3) as the most suitable time to signal their preferences to their game partners for the following rounds. Figure 1 depicts the rejection rates (in percentages) of the (8/2) distribution across four rounds in each game of Experiment 2.

Bottom Line: In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important.In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation.We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: School of Psychology, University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW, Australia.

ABSTRACT
Behavioral findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they think they are being treated unequally, even at the cost of minimizing their own material payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such non-self-regarding behavior, so-called, altruistic cooperation. In all of our studies, a mini ultimatum game was played either one-shot (in Experiment 1a and 1b) or repeatedly (Experiment 2), and rejections of inequitable distribution were taken as a measure of altruistic cooperation. In Experiment 1a, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation. We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer.

No MeSH data available.