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Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

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Dependence of cooperation, average perspectives of cooperators and average perspectives of defectors (left to right) on evolutionary timescales.Simulations are for ,  (top) on  and for  (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.
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pone-0056016-g010: Dependence of cooperation, average perspectives of cooperators and average perspectives of defectors (left to right) on evolutionary timescales.Simulations are for , (top) on and for (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.

Mentions: Simulations have been carried out for an exhaustive exploration of the parameter space spanned by the probabilities , , and . By giving the average prevalence of cooperators and average perspectives of cooperators and defectors, Figure 10 visualizes the results. Two dilemma strengths are analysed in the figure, a very tough dilemma setting with (top panels) and a lower setting with (bottom panels). Three observations stand out.


Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Dependence of cooperation, average perspectives of cooperators and average perspectives of defectors (left to right) on evolutionary timescales.Simulations are for ,  (top) on  and for  (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3569424&req=5

pone-0056016-g010: Dependence of cooperation, average perspectives of cooperators and average perspectives of defectors (left to right) on evolutionary timescales.Simulations are for , (top) on and for (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.
Mentions: Simulations have been carried out for an exhaustive exploration of the parameter space spanned by the probabilities , , and . By giving the average prevalence of cooperators and average perspectives of cooperators and defectors, Figure 10 visualizes the results. Two dilemma strengths are analysed in the figure, a very tough dilemma setting with (top panels) and a lower setting with (bottom panels). Three observations stand out.

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

Show MeSH
Related in: MedlinePlus