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Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

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Snapshots of agent configurations illustrating the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The snapshots are taken after 3,20,40,70,100 and 1000 sweeps (left to right) with parameters  and . Cooperators are blue, defectors red, darkness of the colour indicates perspective, dark indicates long term () and bright indicates short term (. See fig. 7 for averaged trajectories.
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pone-0056016-g006: Snapshots of agent configurations illustrating the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The snapshots are taken after 3,20,40,70,100 and 1000 sweeps (left to right) with parameters and . Cooperators are blue, defectors red, darkness of the colour indicates perspective, dark indicates long term () and bright indicates short term (. See fig. 7 for averaged trajectories.

Mentions: Figures 6 and 7 illustrate typical scenarios in the evolution of cooperation in the above case and several stages in the evolution can be discerned. Initially, long term horizons grow to dominance in both the cooperator and defector populations. In the first case this is the scenario described in the previous subsection. In the case of defectors, the initial long-term horizons are related to the initial payoff bonanza for defectors in random allocations of cooperators and defectors. Long time horizons dominate, because they can lock in a memory of the initially high payoffs reminiscent of the initial conditions. However, when simulation times approach the memory time horizon of , this memory starts to fade and cooperators can invade the large areas of long term time horizon defectors. Pockets of short term defectors are the only defectors that eventually survive and a fluctuating steady state pattern of long term evaluating cooperators and short term evaluating defectors is approached.


Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Snapshots of agent configurations illustrating the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The snapshots are taken after 3,20,40,70,100 and 1000 sweeps (left to right) with parameters  and . Cooperators are blue, defectors red, darkness of the colour indicates perspective, dark indicates long term () and bright indicates short term (. See fig. 7 for averaged trajectories.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3569424&req=5

pone-0056016-g006: Snapshots of agent configurations illustrating the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The snapshots are taken after 3,20,40,70,100 and 1000 sweeps (left to right) with parameters and . Cooperators are blue, defectors red, darkness of the colour indicates perspective, dark indicates long term () and bright indicates short term (. See fig. 7 for averaged trajectories.
Mentions: Figures 6 and 7 illustrate typical scenarios in the evolution of cooperation in the above case and several stages in the evolution can be discerned. Initially, long term horizons grow to dominance in both the cooperator and defector populations. In the first case this is the scenario described in the previous subsection. In the case of defectors, the initial long-term horizons are related to the initial payoff bonanza for defectors in random allocations of cooperators and defectors. Long time horizons dominate, because they can lock in a memory of the initially high payoffs reminiscent of the initial conditions. However, when simulation times approach the memory time horizon of , this memory starts to fade and cooperators can invade the large areas of long term time horizon defectors. Pockets of short term defectors are the only defectors that eventually survive and a fluctuating steady state pattern of long term evaluating cooperators and short term evaluating defectors is approached.

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

Show MeSH
Related in: MedlinePlus