Limits...
Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

Show MeSH

Related in: MedlinePlus

An illustration of the stationary states in the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The panels give distribitions of evolved perspectives (top) and the dependence of the average frequency of cooperators on perspectives (bottom). The figures show results from simulations on a  torus with , . In the right hand panels a small chance () of misperception when adopting another agent's strategies is included. In case of a misperception, an agent adopts the opposite of the game strategy of the reference agent and chooses a new perspective uniformly at random from the interval . Without misperceptions around  of agents are cooperators, with misperceptions only around  are cooperators.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection


getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3569424&req=5

pone-0056016-g004: An illustration of the stationary states in the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The panels give distribitions of evolved perspectives (top) and the dependence of the average frequency of cooperators on perspectives (bottom). The figures show results from simulations on a torus with , . In the right hand panels a small chance () of misperception when adopting another agent's strategies is included. In case of a misperception, an agent adopts the opposite of the game strategy of the reference agent and chooses a new perspective uniformly at random from the interval . Without misperceptions around of agents are cooperators, with misperceptions only around are cooperators.

Mentions: By recording stationary distributions of perspectives (top) and giving statistics of the frequencies with which agents with a certain perspective are cooperators (bottom), figure 4 summarizes typical simulation outcomes on a torus for situations with and without mutations. In both cases, a clear separation of agents into two groups becomes apparent. One peak of the bimodal distribution of perspectives corresponds to agents who almost always defect, the second to agents who almost always cooperate (cf. bottom panels of Fig. 4).


Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

An illustration of the stationary states in the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The panels give distribitions of evolved perspectives (top) and the dependence of the average frequency of cooperators on perspectives (bottom). The figures show results from simulations on a  torus with , . In the right hand panels a small chance () of misperception when adopting another agent's strategies is included. In case of a misperception, an agent adopts the opposite of the game strategy of the reference agent and chooses a new perspective uniformly at random from the interval . Without misperceptions around  of agents are cooperators, with misperceptions only around  are cooperators.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3569424&req=5

pone-0056016-g004: An illustration of the stationary states in the co-evolution of perspectives and strategies.The panels give distribitions of evolved perspectives (top) and the dependence of the average frequency of cooperators on perspectives (bottom). The figures show results from simulations on a torus with , . In the right hand panels a small chance () of misperception when adopting another agent's strategies is included. In case of a misperception, an agent adopts the opposite of the game strategy of the reference agent and chooses a new perspective uniformly at random from the interval . Without misperceptions around of agents are cooperators, with misperceptions only around are cooperators.
Mentions: By recording stationary distributions of perspectives (top) and giving statistics of the frequencies with which agents with a certain perspective are cooperators (bottom), figure 4 summarizes typical simulation outcomes on a torus for situations with and without mutations. In both cases, a clear separation of agents into two groups becomes apparent. One peak of the bimodal distribution of perspectives corresponds to agents who almost always defect, the second to agents who almost always cooperate (cf. bottom panels of Fig. 4).

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

Show MeSH
Related in: MedlinePlus