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Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

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Snapshots of agent configurations on alattice. The snapshots were taken after , , , and  full update sweeps. Parameters are ,  and .
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pone-0056016-g002: Snapshots of agent configurations on alattice. The snapshots were taken after , , , and full update sweeps. Parameters are , and .

Mentions: In this section I will consider the case that all agents share the same interest/discount parameter . Figure 1 shows a typical trajectory for the evolution of cooperation in a tough dilemma situation () when strategy spread is influenced by memory of past payoffs (). Illustrations of typical arrangements of cooperators and defectors at the various stages of the evolution are given in Fig. 2. Starting with a random allocation of cooperators and defectors, the evolution follows the known pattern: defectors can earn the highest payoffs in random arrangements and consequently they spread over a large part of the lattice, such that only little pockets of cooperators remain. Once an ordered arrangement of cooperators and defectors has been reached, clusters of cooperators may start to expand again until an equilibrium between cooperators and defectors is reached.


Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

Brede M - PLoS ONE (2013)

Snapshots of agent configurations on alattice. The snapshots were taken after , , , and  full update sweeps. Parameters are ,  and .
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3569424&req=5

pone-0056016-g002: Snapshots of agent configurations on alattice. The snapshots were taken after , , , and full update sweeps. Parameters are , and .
Mentions: In this section I will consider the case that all agents share the same interest/discount parameter . Figure 1 shows a typical trajectory for the evolution of cooperation in a tough dilemma situation () when strategy spread is influenced by memory of past payoffs (). Illustrations of typical arrangements of cooperators and defectors at the various stages of the evolution are given in Fig. 2. Starting with a random allocation of cooperators and defectors, the evolution follows the known pattern: defectors can earn the highest payoffs in random arrangements and consequently they spread over a large part of the lattice, such that only little pockets of cooperators remain. Once an ordered arrangement of cooperators and defectors has been reached, clusters of cooperators may start to expand again until an equilibrium between cooperators and defectors is reached.

Bottom Line: In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators.For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons.Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

Show MeSH
Related in: MedlinePlus