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Open evaluation: a vision for entirely transparent post-publication peer review and rating for science.

Kriegeskorte N - Front Comput Neurosci (2012)

Bottom Line: Complex PEFs will use advanced statistical techniques to infer the quality of a paper.The continual refinement of PEFs in response to attempts by individuals to influence evaluations in their own favor will make the system ungameable.OA and OE together have the power to revolutionize scientific publishing and usher in a new culture of transparency, constructive criticism, and collaboration.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Medical Research Council, Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Cambridge, UK.

ABSTRACT
The two major functions of a scientific publishing system are to provide access to and evaluation of scientific papers. While open access (OA) is becoming a reality, open evaluation (OE), the other side of the coin, has received less attention. Evaluation steers the attention of the scientific community and thus the very course of science. It also influences the use of scientific findings in public policy. The current system of scientific publishing provides only journal prestige as an indication of the quality of new papers and relies on a non-transparent and noisy pre-publication peer-review process, which delays publication by many months on average. Here I propose an OE system, in which papers are evaluated post-publication in an ongoing fashion by means of open peer review and rating. Through signed ratings and reviews, scientists steer the attention of their field and build their reputation. Reviewers are motivated to be objective, because low-quality or self-serving signed evaluations will negatively impact their reputation. A core feature of this proposal is a division of powers between the accumulation of evaluative evidence and the analysis of this evidence by paper evaluation functions (PEFs). PEFs can be freely defined by individuals or groups (e.g., scientific societies) and provide a plurality of perspectives on the scientific literature. Simple PEFs will use averages of ratings, weighting reviewers (e.g., by H-index), and rating scales (e.g., by relevance to a decision process) in different ways. Complex PEFs will use advanced statistical techniques to infer the quality of a paper. Papers with initially promising ratings will be more deeply evaluated. The continual refinement of PEFs in response to attempts by individuals to influence evaluations in their own favor will make the system ungameable. OA and OE together have the power to revolutionize scientific publishing and usher in a new culture of transparency, constructive criticism, and collaboration.

No MeSH data available.


The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige. Journal prestige creates its own reality through two types of self-fulfilling prophecy. The first type (top) is a virtuous cycle, in which high prestige leads to high-quality submissions. As a result, the papers selected for publication are also of higher quality, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is virtuous because it makes journal prestige a somewhat reliable signal. The second type of self-fulfilling prophecy (bottom) is a vicious cycle, in which high prestige leads to high attention being paid to papers (even those of lesser quality). This boosts their citation rate, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is vicious because it compromises the reliability of journal prestige as an evaluative signal. In the current system, journal prestige is the only evaluative signal available for new papers, so it is widely relied upon by scientists, despite its limited reliability.
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Figure 2: The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige. Journal prestige creates its own reality through two types of self-fulfilling prophecy. The first type (top) is a virtuous cycle, in which high prestige leads to high-quality submissions. As a result, the papers selected for publication are also of higher quality, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is virtuous because it makes journal prestige a somewhat reliable signal. The second type of self-fulfilling prophecy (bottom) is a vicious cycle, in which high prestige leads to high attention being paid to papers (even those of lesser quality). This boosts their citation rate, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is vicious because it compromises the reliability of journal prestige as an evaluative signal. In the current system, journal prestige is the only evaluative signal available for new papers, so it is widely relied upon by scientists, despite its limited reliability.

Mentions: The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige has two component cycles of causality, a virtuous one and a vicious one (Figure 2). In the virtuous cycle, prestige brings higher-quality submissions, which in turn contribute to prestige. This cycle is virtuous, because the increase in prestige actually reflects an increase in the quality of the papers. In the vicious cycle, prestige brings higher-citation frequencies (even for average-quality papers), which in turn brings prestige. This cycle is vicious, because it causes journal impact factors (IF) to give a distorted picture of the quality of the published papers. IFs and the higher or lesser prestige they confer on journals therefore compromise the public perception of the quality of particular papers.


Open evaluation: a vision for entirely transparent post-publication peer review and rating for science.

Kriegeskorte N - Front Comput Neurosci (2012)

The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige. Journal prestige creates its own reality through two types of self-fulfilling prophecy. The first type (top) is a virtuous cycle, in which high prestige leads to high-quality submissions. As a result, the papers selected for publication are also of higher quality, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is virtuous because it makes journal prestige a somewhat reliable signal. The second type of self-fulfilling prophecy (bottom) is a vicious cycle, in which high prestige leads to high attention being paid to papers (even those of lesser quality). This boosts their citation rate, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is vicious because it compromises the reliability of journal prestige as an evaluative signal. In the current system, journal prestige is the only evaluative signal available for new papers, so it is widely relied upon by scientists, despite its limited reliability.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3473231&req=5

Figure 2: The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige. Journal prestige creates its own reality through two types of self-fulfilling prophecy. The first type (top) is a virtuous cycle, in which high prestige leads to high-quality submissions. As a result, the papers selected for publication are also of higher quality, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is virtuous because it makes journal prestige a somewhat reliable signal. The second type of self-fulfilling prophecy (bottom) is a vicious cycle, in which high prestige leads to high attention being paid to papers (even those of lesser quality). This boosts their citation rate, which in turn contributes to journal prestige. This cycle is vicious because it compromises the reliability of journal prestige as an evaluative signal. In the current system, journal prestige is the only evaluative signal available for new papers, so it is widely relied upon by scientists, despite its limited reliability.
Mentions: The self-fulfilling prophecy of journal prestige has two component cycles of causality, a virtuous one and a vicious one (Figure 2). In the virtuous cycle, prestige brings higher-quality submissions, which in turn contribute to prestige. This cycle is virtuous, because the increase in prestige actually reflects an increase in the quality of the papers. In the vicious cycle, prestige brings higher-citation frequencies (even for average-quality papers), which in turn brings prestige. This cycle is vicious, because it causes journal impact factors (IF) to give a distorted picture of the quality of the published papers. IFs and the higher or lesser prestige they confer on journals therefore compromise the public perception of the quality of particular papers.

Bottom Line: Complex PEFs will use advanced statistical techniques to infer the quality of a paper.The continual refinement of PEFs in response to attempts by individuals to influence evaluations in their own favor will make the system ungameable.OA and OE together have the power to revolutionize scientific publishing and usher in a new culture of transparency, constructive criticism, and collaboration.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Medical Research Council, Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Cambridge, UK.

ABSTRACT
The two major functions of a scientific publishing system are to provide access to and evaluation of scientific papers. While open access (OA) is becoming a reality, open evaluation (OE), the other side of the coin, has received less attention. Evaluation steers the attention of the scientific community and thus the very course of science. It also influences the use of scientific findings in public policy. The current system of scientific publishing provides only journal prestige as an indication of the quality of new papers and relies on a non-transparent and noisy pre-publication peer-review process, which delays publication by many months on average. Here I propose an OE system, in which papers are evaluated post-publication in an ongoing fashion by means of open peer review and rating. Through signed ratings and reviews, scientists steer the attention of their field and build their reputation. Reviewers are motivated to be objective, because low-quality or self-serving signed evaluations will negatively impact their reputation. A core feature of this proposal is a division of powers between the accumulation of evaluative evidence and the analysis of this evidence by paper evaluation functions (PEFs). PEFs can be freely defined by individuals or groups (e.g., scientific societies) and provide a plurality of perspectives on the scientific literature. Simple PEFs will use averages of ratings, weighting reviewers (e.g., by H-index), and rating scales (e.g., by relevance to a decision process) in different ways. Complex PEFs will use advanced statistical techniques to infer the quality of a paper. Papers with initially promising ratings will be more deeply evaluated. The continual refinement of PEFs in response to attempts by individuals to influence evaluations in their own favor will make the system ungameable. OA and OE together have the power to revolutionize scientific publishing and usher in a new culture of transparency, constructive criticism, and collaboration.

No MeSH data available.