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Coordination dynamics in a socially situated nervous system.

Coey CA, Varlet M, Richardson MJ - Front Hum Neurosci (2012)

Bottom Line: Alternatively, we propose that a full appreciation of the role of neural processes in social interactions requires appropriately situating them in their context of embodied-embedded constraints.To this end, we introduce concepts from dynamical systems theory and review research demonstrating that the organization of human behavior, including social behavior, can be accounted for in terms of self-organizing processes and lawful dynamics of animal-environment systems.Ultimately, we hope that these alternative concepts can complement the recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and thereby provide opportunities to develop a complete and coherent account of human social interaction.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, Perceptual-Motor Dynamics Laboratory, CAP Center for Cognition, Action, and Perception, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati OH, USA.

ABSTRACT
Traditional theories of cognitive science have typically accounted for the organization of human behavior by detailing requisite computational/representational functions and identifying neurological mechanisms that might perform these functions. Put simply, such approaches hold that neural activity causes behavior. This same general framework has been extended to accounts of human social behavior via concepts such as "common-coding" and "co-representation" and much recent neurological research has been devoted to brain structures that might execute these social-cognitive functions. Although these neural processes are unquestionably involved in the organization and control of human social interactions, there is good reason to question whether they should be accorded explanatory primacy. Alternatively, we propose that a full appreciation of the role of neural processes in social interactions requires appropriately situating them in their context of embodied-embedded constraints. To this end, we introduce concepts from dynamical systems theory and review research demonstrating that the organization of human behavior, including social behavior, can be accounted for in terms of self-organizing processes and lawful dynamics of animal-environment systems. Ultimately, we hope that these alternative concepts can complement the recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and thereby provide opportunities to develop a complete and coherent account of human social interaction.

No MeSH data available.


(A) Rhythmic pendulum swinging expressed in phase angle and represented as a position time-series and a position-by-velocity phase space. (B) Inphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle and represented as a time-series and a phase pace. (C) Antiphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle.
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Figure 1: (A) Rhythmic pendulum swinging expressed in phase angle and represented as a position time-series and a position-by-velocity phase space. (B) Inphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle and represented as a time-series and a phase pace. (C) Antiphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle.

Mentions: Foregoing a complete technical description (see Pikovsky et al., 2001), the movement of an oscillatory limb at any point in its cycle can be described using the “phase angle” (θ) of its circular trajectory on the position-by-velocity phase space (see Figure 1). That is, the beginning of each rhythmic cycle (θ = 0°) corresponds to the limb being at a maximal, end-point position (e.g., finger completely up), but with zero velocity (e.g., no longer moving upward, and yet to move downward). As the limb moves through its rhythmic cycle, it speeds up and slows down to reach its opposite end-point position (e.g., finger completely down) which corresponds to the half-cycle (i.e., θ = 180°). The limb again speeds up and slows down, now in the opposite direction, to return to its starting position (i.e., θ = 360°/0°).


Coordination dynamics in a socially situated nervous system.

Coey CA, Varlet M, Richardson MJ - Front Hum Neurosci (2012)

(A) Rhythmic pendulum swinging expressed in phase angle and represented as a position time-series and a position-by-velocity phase space. (B) Inphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle and represented as a time-series and a phase pace. (C) Antiphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle.
© Copyright Policy - open-access
Related In: Results  -  Collection

License
Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3369191&req=5

Figure 1: (A) Rhythmic pendulum swinging expressed in phase angle and represented as a position time-series and a position-by-velocity phase space. (B) Inphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle and represented as a time-series and a phase pace. (C) Antiphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase angle.
Mentions: Foregoing a complete technical description (see Pikovsky et al., 2001), the movement of an oscillatory limb at any point in its cycle can be described using the “phase angle” (θ) of its circular trajectory on the position-by-velocity phase space (see Figure 1). That is, the beginning of each rhythmic cycle (θ = 0°) corresponds to the limb being at a maximal, end-point position (e.g., finger completely up), but with zero velocity (e.g., no longer moving upward, and yet to move downward). As the limb moves through its rhythmic cycle, it speeds up and slows down to reach its opposite end-point position (e.g., finger completely down) which corresponds to the half-cycle (i.e., θ = 180°). The limb again speeds up and slows down, now in the opposite direction, to return to its starting position (i.e., θ = 360°/0°).

Bottom Line: Alternatively, we propose that a full appreciation of the role of neural processes in social interactions requires appropriately situating them in their context of embodied-embedded constraints.To this end, we introduce concepts from dynamical systems theory and review research demonstrating that the organization of human behavior, including social behavior, can be accounted for in terms of self-organizing processes and lawful dynamics of animal-environment systems.Ultimately, we hope that these alternative concepts can complement the recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and thereby provide opportunities to develop a complete and coherent account of human social interaction.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Psychology, Perceptual-Motor Dynamics Laboratory, CAP Center for Cognition, Action, and Perception, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati OH, USA.

ABSTRACT
Traditional theories of cognitive science have typically accounted for the organization of human behavior by detailing requisite computational/representational functions and identifying neurological mechanisms that might perform these functions. Put simply, such approaches hold that neural activity causes behavior. This same general framework has been extended to accounts of human social behavior via concepts such as "common-coding" and "co-representation" and much recent neurological research has been devoted to brain structures that might execute these social-cognitive functions. Although these neural processes are unquestionably involved in the organization and control of human social interactions, there is good reason to question whether they should be accorded explanatory primacy. Alternatively, we propose that a full appreciation of the role of neural processes in social interactions requires appropriately situating them in their context of embodied-embedded constraints. To this end, we introduce concepts from dynamical systems theory and review research demonstrating that the organization of human behavior, including social behavior, can be accounted for in terms of self-organizing processes and lawful dynamics of animal-environment systems. Ultimately, we hope that these alternative concepts can complement the recent advances in cognitive neuroscience and thereby provide opportunities to develop a complete and coherent account of human social interaction.

No MeSH data available.