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Kin selection and the evolution of social information use in animal conflict.

Baker CC, Dall SR, Rankin DJ - PLoS ONE (2012)

Bottom Line: We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping, both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed.We show that relatedness influences the evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness.Our study highlights the importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America. ccmbaker@fas.harvard.edu

ABSTRACT
Animals often use social information about conspecifics in making decisions about cooperation and conflict. While the importance of kin selection in the evolution of intraspecific cooperation and conflict is widely acknowledged, few studies have examined how relatedness influences the evolution of social information use. Here we specifically examine how relatedness affects the evolution of a stylised form of social information use known as eavesdropping. Eavesdropping involves individuals escalating conflicts with rivals observed to have lost their last encounter and avoiding fights with those seen to have won. We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping, both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed. We show that relatedness influences the evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness. Our study highlights the importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use.

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Phenotypes in equilibrium in the discrete strategies model.Labels indicate genotypes with positive equilibrium frequencies under error-free eavesdropping (α = 1) with E = eavesdroppers, H = hawks and D = doves.
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pone-0031664-g001: Phenotypes in equilibrium in the discrete strategies model.Labels indicate genotypes with positive equilibrium frequencies under error-free eavesdropping (α = 1) with E = eavesdroppers, H = hawks and D = doves.

Mentions: We use these probabilities to determine each genotype's average payoff as a function of the fi. We assume no mutation or drift, and allow the frequencies of the eavesdropper, hawk and dove genotypes to evolve according to standard continuous replicator dynamics [25], [26]. Solving for the frequencies that give equal fitness to the three genotypes gives the following long-run equilibrium frequencies:(4)When r = 0, the model is identical to that in [7]. For positive r, all three genotypes still coexist stably, at frequencies given by (4), as long as(5)But if (5) does not hold, then (4) gives frequencies outside the range [0,1], implying that one or more of the genotypes will be driven to extinction or fixation. For v/c>0.5, eavesdroppers and hawks coexist stably, with doves driven towards extinction over time, if(6)and eavesdroppers go to fixation if(7)If , eavesdroppers and doves coexist stably, with hawks driven towards extinction over time, if(8)otherwise doves go to fixation. Figures 1, 2 and 3 summarise these equilibria as a function of r and v/c. A more detailed derivation and description of these results is shown in Material S1.


Kin selection and the evolution of social information use in animal conflict.

Baker CC, Dall SR, Rankin DJ - PLoS ONE (2012)

Phenotypes in equilibrium in the discrete strategies model.Labels indicate genotypes with positive equilibrium frequencies under error-free eavesdropping (α = 1) with E = eavesdroppers, H = hawks and D = doves.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

Show All Figures
getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3285175&req=5

pone-0031664-g001: Phenotypes in equilibrium in the discrete strategies model.Labels indicate genotypes with positive equilibrium frequencies under error-free eavesdropping (α = 1) with E = eavesdroppers, H = hawks and D = doves.
Mentions: We use these probabilities to determine each genotype's average payoff as a function of the fi. We assume no mutation or drift, and allow the frequencies of the eavesdropper, hawk and dove genotypes to evolve according to standard continuous replicator dynamics [25], [26]. Solving for the frequencies that give equal fitness to the three genotypes gives the following long-run equilibrium frequencies:(4)When r = 0, the model is identical to that in [7]. For positive r, all three genotypes still coexist stably, at frequencies given by (4), as long as(5)But if (5) does not hold, then (4) gives frequencies outside the range [0,1], implying that one or more of the genotypes will be driven to extinction or fixation. For v/c>0.5, eavesdroppers and hawks coexist stably, with doves driven towards extinction over time, if(6)and eavesdroppers go to fixation if(7)If , eavesdroppers and doves coexist stably, with hawks driven towards extinction over time, if(8)otherwise doves go to fixation. Figures 1, 2 and 3 summarise these equilibria as a function of r and v/c. A more detailed derivation and description of these results is shown in Material S1.

Bottom Line: We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping, both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed.We show that relatedness influences the evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness.Our study highlights the importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America. ccmbaker@fas.harvard.edu

ABSTRACT
Animals often use social information about conspecifics in making decisions about cooperation and conflict. While the importance of kin selection in the evolution of intraspecific cooperation and conflict is widely acknowledged, few studies have examined how relatedness influences the evolution of social information use. Here we specifically examine how relatedness affects the evolution of a stylised form of social information use known as eavesdropping. Eavesdropping involves individuals escalating conflicts with rivals observed to have lost their last encounter and avoiding fights with those seen to have won. We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping, both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed. We show that relatedness influences the evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness. Our study highlights the importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use.

Show MeSH