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Axelrod's metanorm games on networks.

Galán JM, Łatek MM, Rizi SM - PLoS ONE (2011)

Bottom Line: Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation.Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation.In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperation.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Área de Organización de Empresas, Departamento de Ingeniería Civil, Universidad de Burgos, Burgos, Spain. jmgalan@ubu.es

ABSTRACT
Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod's analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperation.

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Examples of methods of solving social dilemmas based on Kollock's ontology [11].Solutions to social dilemmas can be classified as motivational, strategic or structural depending on whether players are assumed egoist and whether the rules of the game can be changed.
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pone-0020474-g001: Examples of methods of solving social dilemmas based on Kollock's ontology [11].Solutions to social dilemmas can be classified as motivational, strategic or structural depending on whether players are assumed egoist and whether the rules of the game can be changed.

Mentions: Proposed methods of avoiding the generally undesirable outcomes of social dilemmas vary widely and frequently depend on context. Kollock [11] classifies these methods based on whether players are assumed egoist and whether they can change the rules of the game. His classification divides solutions to social dilemmas into motivational [12]–[16], strategic [17]–[20] or structural [2], [12], [21]–[32] (See Figure 1). In motivational solutions like moral persuasion, a player gives some weight to the results other players obtain. In strategic solutions such as reciprocity, conditional association and grim triggers, an egoistic player influences other players' behavior by expanding the range of strategies he considers. Neither solution requires coordinated or top-down modifications of the rules of the game. In structural solutions such as sanctions, central authority or privatization, the rules of the game are changed to solve the dilemma.


Axelrod's metanorm games on networks.

Galán JM, Łatek MM, Rizi SM - PLoS ONE (2011)

Examples of methods of solving social dilemmas based on Kollock's ontology [11].Solutions to social dilemmas can be classified as motivational, strategic or structural depending on whether players are assumed egoist and whether the rules of the game can be changed.
© Copyright Policy
Related In: Results  -  Collection

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getmorefigures.php?uid=PMC3105066&req=5

pone-0020474-g001: Examples of methods of solving social dilemmas based on Kollock's ontology [11].Solutions to social dilemmas can be classified as motivational, strategic or structural depending on whether players are assumed egoist and whether the rules of the game can be changed.
Mentions: Proposed methods of avoiding the generally undesirable outcomes of social dilemmas vary widely and frequently depend on context. Kollock [11] classifies these methods based on whether players are assumed egoist and whether they can change the rules of the game. His classification divides solutions to social dilemmas into motivational [12]–[16], strategic [17]–[20] or structural [2], [12], [21]–[32] (See Figure 1). In motivational solutions like moral persuasion, a player gives some weight to the results other players obtain. In strategic solutions such as reciprocity, conditional association and grim triggers, an egoistic player influences other players' behavior by expanding the range of strategies he considers. Neither solution requires coordinated or top-down modifications of the rules of the game. In structural solutions such as sanctions, central authority or privatization, the rules of the game are changed to solve the dilemma.

Bottom Line: Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation.Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation.In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperation.

View Article: PubMed Central - PubMed

Affiliation: Área de Organización de Empresas, Departamento de Ingeniería Civil, Universidad de Burgos, Burgos, Spain. jmgalan@ubu.es

ABSTRACT
Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod's analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperation.

Show MeSH